

Another Perspective to IP-Darkspace Analysis



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Motivation

- IP-darkspace is
 - Routable non-used address space of an ISP (Internet Service Provider),
 - arriving traffic is unidirectional
 - and unsolicited.
- Is there any traffic in those darkspaces?
- If yes, what and why does it arrive there?
 - And on purpose or by mischance?
- What's the security impact?
- What are the security recommendations?

Why is there traffic?

Origins

- Attackers (and researchers) scan networks to find vulnerable systems (e.g. SSH brute-force).
- Backscatter traffic (e.g. from spoofed DoS).
- Self-replicating code using network as a vector (e.g. conficker, residual worms).
- Badly configured devices especially embedded devices (e.g. printers, server, routers).
 - → Our IP-darkspace is especially suited for spelling errors from the RFC1918 (private networks) address space.

Why is there traffic

Typing/Spelling errors with RFC1918 networks

- While typing an IP address, different error categories might emerge:

Hit wrong key	19 2 .x.z.y →	19 3 .x.y.z
Omission of number	1 9 2.x.y.z →	12.x.y.z
Doubling of keys	10.a.b.c →	1 00 .a.b.c
	172.x.y.z	1 5 2.x.y.z

Research activities related to spelling errors

Spelling errors apply to text but also network configuration


- 34% omissions of 1 character
 - Example: Network → Netork
- 23% of all errors happen on 3rd position of a word
 - Example: Text → Test)
- 94% spellings errors are single errors in word
 - And do not reappear

References

- Pollock J. J. and Zamora A., Collection and characterization of spelling errors in scientific and scholarly text. J. Amer. Soc. Inf. Sci. 34, 1, 51-58, 1983.
- Kukich K., Techniques for automatically correcting words in text. ACM Comput. Surv. 24, 4, 377-439, 1992.

IP-Darkspace: Data Collection

Implementation



- Minimal sensor collecting IP-Darkspace networks (close to RFC1918 address space).
- Raw pcap are captured with the full payload.
- Netbeacon^a developed to ensure consistent packet capture.

^awww.github.com/adulau/netbeacon/

Dataset collected

- from 2012-03-12 until 2012-11-04 (still active).
- 90 gigabytes of raw pcap were collected.
- Constant stream of packets (150kbit/s) from two /22 network blocks.
 - no day/night profile.
- Some peaks at 800kbit/s (e.g. often TCP RST from back scatter traffic).

General observations

- A large part of traffic is coming from badly configured devices (e.g. RFC1918 spelling errors).
 - Printers, embedded devices, routers or even server.
 - Trying to do name resolution on non-existing DNS servers, NTP or sending syslog messages.
- Even if the black-hole is passive, payload of stateless UDP packets or even TCP (due to asymmetric routing on misspelled network) datagrams are present.
- Internal network scanning and reconnaissance tool (e.g. internal network enumeration).

Observation per AS

Traffic seen in the darknet

N	Frequency	ASN
1	4596319	4134
2	1382960	4837
3	367515	3462
4	312984	4766
5	211468	4812
6	166110	9394
7	156303	9121
8	153585	4808
9	135811	9318
10	116105	4788

- Occurrences of activities matching the proportion of hosts in a country.
- Chinese great-wall is not filtering leaked packets.

Network reconnaissance: a few machine names

ASTTF.NET

ASUEGYI.INFO

ASUS1025C

DEFAULT

DELICIOUS.COM

DELL

DELL1400

DELL335873

DELL7777

DELL-PC

DELLPOP3

HELP.163.COM

HP_CLIENT1

MACBOOKAIR-CAD7

MACBOOK-B5BA66

MACBOOKPRO-5357

MAIL.AFT20.COM

S3.QHIMG.COM

SERVERWEB

SERVEUR

SERVICE.QQ.COM

SMTP.163.COM

And many more ...

Network reconnaissance: NetBios machine types

23	Browser Server
4	Client?
1	Client? M <ACTIVE>
21	Domain Controller
1	Domain Controller M <ACTIVE>
11	Master Browser
1	NameType=0x00 Workstation
1	NameType=0x20 Server
105	Server
26	Unknown
1	Unknown <GROUP> B <ACTIVE>
5	Unknown <GROUP> M <ACTIVE>
1322	Workstation
1	Workstation M <ACTIVE>

Network reconnaissance (and potential misuse): DNS

```
3684 _msdcs.<companyname>.local
1232666 time.euro.apple.com
104 time.euro.apple.com.<mylocaldomain>
122 ocsp.tcs.terena.org
50000+ ocsp.<variousCA>
```

- DNS queries to an incorrect nameserver could lead to major misuse.
- A single typo in a list of 3 nameservers is usually unnoticed.

Printer syslog to the world

or how to tell to the world your printer status

2012-03-12 18:00:42

```
SYSLOG lpr.error printer: offline  
or intervention needed
```

2012-03-23 21:51:24.985290

```
SYSLOG lpr.error printer: paper out
```

...

2012-08-06 19:14:57.248337

```
SYSLOG lpr.error printer: paper jam
```

- Printers are just an example out of many syslog messages from various devices.
- Information leaked could be used by attackers to gain more information or improve targeted attacks.

How to configure your router (without security)

Enable command logging and send the logs to a random syslog server

```
Aug 13 10:11:51 M6000-G5 command-log:[10:11:51 08-13-2012
  VtyNo: vty1  UserName: XXX IP: XXX ReturnCode: 1
  CMDLine: show subscriber interface gei-0/2/1/12.60
Aug 13 10:46:05 M6000-G5 command-log:[10:46:05 08-13-2012
  VtyNo: vty2  UserName: XXX IP: XXX  ReturnCode: 1
  CMDLine: conf t ]
Aug 13 10:46:10 M6000-G5 command-log:[10:46:10 08-13-2012
  VtyNo: vty2  UserName: XXX IP: XXX  ReturnCode: 1  CMD
Line: aaa-authentication-template 1100 ]
...
```

We will let you guess the sensitive part afterwards...

Conclusions

- Security recommendations
 - **Default routing/NAT to Internet in operational network is evil.**
 - Use fully qualified domain names.
 - Double check syslog exports via UDP (e.g. information leakage is easy).
 - Verify any default configuration with SNMP (e.g. enable by default on some embedded devices).
- Offensive usage? What does it happen if a malicious Internet operator is responding to misspelled RFC1918 addresses? (e.g. DNS/NTP requests, software update or proxy request).